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## PERSONALISM AS A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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THERE are two types of philosophy of religion: that which explains religion, and that which explains it away. Too often each type is judged summarily by its conclusions rather than by the force of its arguments or the experiences on which it builds. The philosophical conclusions which support previously existing beliefs with a minimum of disarrangement of ideas are highly esteemed; those which conflict therewith are often rejected without ceremony. The religiously inclined are not the only prejudiced dogmatists. The irreligious also tend to jump over the reasonings which support a conclusion to revel in praise or blame of the conclusion itself. This emotional attitude is humanly intelligible, but it is manifestly unphilosophical. Yet altogether too much "philosophical" criticism is tainted with it. All sincere and disciplined philosophy is a protest against it.

Personalism is a philosophical system which frankly belongs to the first of the two above-mentioned types, namely, the type which seeks to explain religion, that is, to interpret its positive truth and value. Personalism has suffered in the intellectual world from the tendency of some of its exponents

and most of its critics to fall into the error to which attention has just been called. It is time that men cease accepting or rejecting this or any other system because it is religious or theistic or idealistic. This essay is written with a view to clearing the air. Its aim is to define the main positions of personalism in such a way as to call attention to the central issues and to contrast the personalistic with opposing interpretations, while laying special stress on the religious significance of the system.

At the outset we should have at least a preliminary definition of our subject. It is embarrassingly true that you can't define or understand a definition of a philosophy until you understand the philosophy itself. But, nevertheless, we may venture to suggest that, for the purposes of our present interest, personalism may be taken to be that philosophical system which holds that the universe is a society of selves, unified by the will and immanent causality of a Supreme Self, and which, therefore, defines matter and the whole system of physical nature in terms of the active, conscious will of that Supreme Self, while it regards human selves (and whatever other selves there may be) as enjoying an existence of their own, dependent, it is true, upon the will of the Supreme Self, yet no part of it.

It is evident that such a philosophy is well adapted to become an interpreter of religion, for the Supreme Self of personalism may be identified with God, the object of religious worship. But personalism is not chiefly, much less exclusively, a philosophy of religion. It is an objective, truth-seeking philosophy, based on the logic of coherence, a synoptic method, an epistemological dualism which (in Kantian fashion) emphasizes the activity of the mind in knowledge, a self psychology, and an activistic metaphysics, closely allied with the monadism of Leibniz—and so is (quantitatively) a pluralism, as opposed to the singularism of a Spinoza, a Hegel, and a Bradley, although it is qualitatively monistic in its idealism. Its posi-

tion on these and other controverted points may turn out to be mistaken; but in every case the position is based on a reasoned investigation of the problems and not on a desire—conscious or unconscious—to defend religion.

Perhaps the best way to clarify our thought is to set down the main theses of personalism in order, so as to present a bird's-eye view of the system.

1. What we immediately experience as the starting-point of all our thought and action and the present fact at all times is our own self. All of our perceptions, feelings, thoughts, desires, volitions—every so-called state of consciousness—belongs to that complex whole which is the total fact of experience for each one of us and is called the self. By the self personalism means a whole of conscious experience, and so rejects any soul-psychology which would find the true self in some transcendent entity or substance which underlies and supports consciousness. This whole is a genuine organic whole, a self-experience, and not a sum of parts; and so personalism rejects associationalism. Since the self is a conscious whole, personalism rejects Watsonian behaviorism. It has closest affinity with purposive, dynamic, and *Gestalt* psychology, and is usually called self psychology. Many personalists make a distinction between self and person. Any complex whole of consciousness is a self; but a self capable of reason and value is called a person. The nature of a person is not evident from the momentary self, but can be known only through the development of its potentialities. This thesis may be summarized by saying, "The self is the datum."[1] If things themselves were the datum, as most realists hold, then the same things must be both large and small, both hot and cold, both at rest and in motion, for they appear thus to different observers and to the same observer under different conditions. It is much simpler and more reasonable to hold that what we experience is our own consciousness, which,

[1] The view here stated is elaborated and defended in the present writer's *A Philosophy of Ideals* (New York: Holt, 1928), Chapter I, Mind.

it is true, interacts with and seeks to describe and define its world.

2. Within our self we discover a principle of logical coherence. This principle is, of course, no peculiar property of any philosophical sect; but personalism makes a peculiar use of it. For, given the self and the principle of coherence, the problem of thought may be restated in the terms, " What do I mean? " It should be noted that the formation and testing of hypotheses is (as Professor Nelson has not long ago pointed out in these columns) essential to the progress of coherent thought.

3. There are objects other than my ideas of them. This is epistemological dualism, a view until recently rather unpopular in current thinking, but brilliantly defended by Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy in his Carus Lectures for 1927. Personalism denies that external things can be given in our immediate experience, but holds that our ideas become utterly incoherent if treated subjectively as referring only to themselves. Our ideas become rational only when they are explained in relation to objects beyond themselves to which they refer.

4. These objects beyond the knowing idea are: my own experiences (any conscious process—past, present or future—may be the object of an idea), other human selves, the world of physical things, universals (mathematical objects, etc.), and values. God is at least an object of thought and perhaps an existing object.

5. Science describes the laws of the appearances of certain selected groups of these objects. Philosophy accepts the results of science, relates the sciences to each other, and raises problems (especially the problems of knowledge and of value) which science does not raise.

6. If these objects are to be thought coherently as belonging in one interacting system, it is more rational to regard them all (even physical things) as of the nature of mind than to adopt any other hypothesis. It is impossible to regard mind as

a form of matter—for it does not fill space or move in space. It is even more unintelligible to regard mind as a form of some *tertium quid* or a collection of neutral entities, for then the problems of interaction and of the specific properties of mind are pushed into the outer darkness. On the other hand, what we call material objects may without any confusion or inconsistency be regarded as the conscious experiences of a Supreme Self, deeds of its active will. In other words: matter does not explain mind, but mind does explain matter. Neither view is easy; neither one is without difficulty. But naturalism involves more obscurity and makes more demands on our faith in the miraculous (the turning of matter into mind outstrips the turning of water into wine!) than does idealism. In an idealistic world, universals and values are the universalizing and valuing experiences of selves; as such, they are more at home than they could be in a world in which mind is a secondary product of the non-mental.

7. The many minds, therefore, communicate through a genuinely objective order. That objective order is the active, rational, concretely experienced, will of the Supreme Self.

8. The nature of the Supreme Self is revealed and further defined through the coherent, synoptic interpretation of the facts of self-experience, especially what we call sense-experience and value-experience.

9. Value-experiences, especially moral and religious experience, point to objective features of reality and indicate that the Supreme Self is also Supreme Value and worthy of worship as God. Notable contributions to this aspect of personalism have been made by W. E. Hocking and W. R. Sorley.

10. The fact of evil indicates that the Supreme Self is achieving value in the temporal order under difficulties. These difficulties are partly to be found in the self-imposed conditions of reason and goodness, and partly in the obstacles caused by human freedom. I have ventured the suggestion elsewhere that within the divine nature there may be a resistent or retarding

factor, akin to sensation in man, which, without diminishing divine goodness or wisdom, constitutes a real problem to divine power and explains the "evil" features of the natural world.

11. The belief in God naturally leads to the belief in human immortality and is, indeed, its only cogent ground. For if God be good, he could not destroy the only intrinsic values there are, namely, persons.

Not every personalist would agree with every thesis which I have framed; nor would every one approach the problems according to the same methods. But I believe that the foregoing points contain a platform on which most personalists would stand with fair agreement.

The personalistic point of view may be made still clearer by contrasting it with other systems.[2] This contrast may be made more fruitful by tracing it to its root principle. I am convinced that few philosophical cleavages go deeper than that between a purely analytic method, which reduces complexes to simple parts and their relations, and a synoptic method, which explains parts in terms of the organic wholes to which they belong. Herbart *vs.* Hegel; or, going further back, Democritus *vs.* Plato; or, coming down to the present, Bertrand Russell *vs.* Hocking.[3] Materialists and realists are purely analytic philosophers. They arrive at atoms of some sort as the ultimate explanation and interpretation of all that is.

Looking more closely, we may say that naturalism and materialism are analytic, but imperfectly so. The atoms and forces with which they operate are the results of analysis, it is true, but of an incomplete analysis; the atom always turns out to be complex, and the philosopher who builds his world out of materialistic bricks later finds that they were gold bricks. Analytic realism, of the type held, for example, by Ralph Barton Perry, is, however, a perfect application of analytic method.

[2] The reader should consult Dean A. C. Knudson's brilliant and scholarly work, *The Philosophy of Personalism* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1927), especially Chapter V, Militant Personalism. On personalism as held by Bowne, see G. C. Cell in the new Ueberweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie: Das Ausland* (Berlin, 1927).

[3] See J. C. Smuts, *Holism and Evolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1926).

He sees the fallacy of naturalism and presses his analysis beyond the atom and all other complexes until he arrives at genuinely simple entities which are neutral, *i. e.,* neither mental nor physical. I cannot pause to consider here the wondrous things which are spoken of these entities;[4] but I can give unstinted praise to the consistency with which analytic realism ("American neo-realism") has followed its method.

On the other hand, many philosophers recognize the legitimate claims of synoptic method. Pragmatism, for example, is synoptic rather than analytic; it faces situations, long runs, total outcomes, rather than seeking for simple elements. But, just as naturalism is imperfectly analytic, so pragmatism is imperfectly synoptic. It is interested in wholes, but not in the Whole; in fragmentary situations, but not in organic unity; it is more concerned about biological and social wholes than about personal and cosmic wholes. It uses the method incompletely. But, if synoptic method be taken exclusively as ultimate principle, in the same way as neo-realism took analytic method as its exclusive principle, the result is absolute idealism, the perfect flower of an exclusively synoptic method. All experience, and so all reality, belongs to one Whole, one Self, according to this view; every element or part in the universe is completely explained by its membership in the Absolute. Analysis is wholly subordinated to synopsis.

But it seems probable that, in such a strife of systems (as Sheldon has called it), neither extreme would have the whole truth; nor would an imperfect approach to either extreme, like naturalism or pragmatism, yield the whole truth. Truth more probably lies in some synthesis which includes both methods. Hegel, it must be granted, intended his absolutism to be such a synthesis, but I believe that the verdict of history is that he failed. Scholasticism is another attempt at a synthesis; and it is a magnificent one.[5] But its dualisms leave the impression

[4] Consult D. L. Evans, *New Realism and Old Reality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1928).

[5] See W. H. Sheldon, *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), Chapter X, The Practical Synthesis, Thomism.

of artificiality and externality, despite the genius of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Personalism offers what, to my mind, is a far more satisfactory synthesis than has yet been proposed. Adopting the synoptic principle and making it supreme, it recognizes the rights of the analytic principle, not merely in science but also in metaphysics. For it believes that the universe must be analyzed into many selves which cannot, without contradiction, be thought of as members of one self. A pluralism of persons with a monism of ultimate purpose seems to meet most satisfactorily the demands of the many and of the one, of analysis and of synopsis.

It remains to inquire what personalism has to say about religion. Personalism builds its philosophy of religion on the facts of the history, psychology, and sociology of religion; but (unlike some current points of view) does not believe that philosophy of religion consists in a recital of those facts. Personalistic philosophy of religion is an interpretation of the facts in relation to a total world-view, a world-view which grows out of a critical analytic-synoptic understanding of all accessible facts in all realms of experience. A brief survey of the personalistic position may be gained by regarding it as metaphysical, ethical, cooperatively social, rational, and mystical, and as accepting a developing immortality. The remainder of our study will be devoted to a fuller explanation of this characterization of personalistic philosophy of religion and to a brief consideration of some objections.

First of all, the personalistic position is metaphysical, as opposed to positivism. Positivism holds that knowledge is confined to the immediate objects of human experience, and hence to the objects of the sciences. Science, all schools agree, does not deal with God as its object, or at least does not do so consciously. Hence positivism finds humanity itself to be the only object of religious experience. Humanity is the Supreme Being, the only God there is. So spoke Auguste Comte, and so speaks the voice of contemporary " humanism," when it is self-

conscious. But personalism holds that if one is going to confine knowledge to immediate experience, one must be an individualistic solipsist, for " the self is the datum." The positivist talks about humanity; but, the personalist points out, " humanity " is a metaphysical object, which no one ever experienced immediately. The personalist argues that if we can go beyond our immediate experience to the existence and experience of other selves, the same logic which grants us that right also grants us the right to define any other objects which are necessary to the explanation of the facts of experience. The very existence of consciousness and of value experience, especially of moral and religious experience, points to some traits of the rest of the universe which makes their existence possible. A real, personal, creative, and active God is, the personalist believes, the only being which possesses traits adequate to explain those experiences. Positivism and humanism are religiously hollow and intellectually unfinished. They simply do not think the problems through. Perhaps no one can think them through in the sense of reaching a point where one is through thinking, and who wants to? But that fact affords no shadow of excuse for getting through before one has fairly begun.

Secondly, personalism is an ethical philosophy of religion. It builds, as we have seen, on value experience; and of all our value experiences the ethical is perhaps the most fundamental. Whether this be true or not, morality is the condition of the realization of all other values in any total and harmonious way. If a man renounces moral obligation, he may have streaks of genius in art, in intellect, or even in religion; but he has abandoned the power which would unify and perpetuate his values. For the personalist, then, the moral will is at the center of personality and hence of religion. Any violation of or disrespect for the moral will is wrong, even if committed in the name of religion. The authoritarian principle is therefore rejected by personalism. No tradition or revelation can be accepted as true because some authority vouches for it. All true religion must

commend itself directly to the moral will and reason of man. On the other hand, personalism is equally insistent on the fact that any general philosophy whatever, in order to be true to its task, must take account of the moral facts from the start; and yet we find a contemporary philosopher like Ralph Barton Perry, who banishes every "moral and spiritual ontology," presenting a "philosophy of disillusionment," yet at the same time arriving at "the hazard of faith" and repudiating the "narrow and abstract predictions of astronomy." In the end, he is willing to greet "the residual cosmos" as a "promise of salvation." This is an inspiring hope, but it is difficult to see how it follows from Perry's premises. Personalism finds a basis for the hope in the fact that experience reveals the cosmos to be moral and spiritual.[6]

Thirdly, personalism is a social philosophy of religion of a definite type, which may be called the cooperative. Personalism believes in the genuine separateness of individual minds, such that no mind is a part of or can become a part of any other mind; it is therefore opposed to belief in a "social mind" as any real fact which either includes or transcends the individuals; much more is it opposed to any absolutism or pantheism which includes all individuals with the One Absolute Self. On the other hand, personalism believes in the genuine interaction of the many individuals, and in the presence within all individuals of common laws and common meanings; hence, despite its individualistic emphasis, personalism is opposed to absolute or anarchistic individualism. Its social theory, then, is that of the free cooperation of different and distinct individual persons in the attainment of common purposes. The aim of the universe, then, is not absorption in the Infinite, nor is it the mere assertion of personal liberty; it is, rather, free and moral cooperation. The essence of religion and religious salvation is cooperation with God.

[6] On the general subject of the fundamental character of the experience of obligation see E. S. Brightman, *Religious Values* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1925), Chapter II, The Moral Basis of Religious Values.

Fourthly, personalism is rational. This does not mean that it regards the universe as an abstract syllogism or that it holds other experiences than thinking in disesteem. Yet in these days when rationalism is a term of reproach in many religious circles and " rationalization " is the by-word of psychology, personalism is rational and proud of it. To be rational, as personalism conceives it, means to arrive at conclusions in the light of a coherent interpretation of all the facts. Reason is simply an inclusive and connected view of experience. To be irrational is either to exclude relevant facts or to be satisfied with a disconnected account of things when a connected account could be discovered by more persistent thought. The most inclusive and connected view is the most reasonable and truest which we can attain, although further experience and thought will expand the horizon of reason. Reason is a principle of growth, not of stagnation. Personalism, then, is opposed to every " irrational " philosophy of religion. It must be admitted, however, that the use of that term in much contemporary German philosophy and theology is very misleading; for it is often intended only to convey the idea that experience contains data which cannot be rationally inferred from other experiences, an idea which is true, but compatible with the right and duty of reason to " prove all things " and especially to " prove the spirits." It should be noted that a rational philosophy of religion leaves room for " revelation," just as it leaves room for conversation with other human selves; but it holds that the meaning of any conversation or revelation can only be determined by reason.

Fifthly, personalism is mystical. Its conception of reason as the coherent interpretation of experience makes it empirical in its emphasis. Experience reveals the fact that the relations of persons are mediated by experiences having a peculiarly immediate emotional quality. The consciousness of the presence of a beloved human being elicits our moral nature and our highest rational powers; but it also produces a uniquely satisfactory feeling-tone which suffuses consciousness with a glow

which nothing else can equal. Such experiences when ascribed to divine influence are called mystical. They constitute the secret of the joy and rapture of religion; and when they occur in a life which is reasonable and moral, they are a source of great strength and inspiration. Lack of that relation to God which makes mystical experience possible is, in my opinion, one of the chief sources of weakness in contemporary American religion. The personalistic conception of mysticism, it need hardly be said, differs from that of the pantheistic mystics. For the personalist, the mystical experience is one of communion, not of union. Or, if one insists on calling it union, it is union of purpose by feelings which subserve that purpose, rather than a union of actual being. Personalism, then, is a philosophy of prayer, laying especial stress on the prayer of communion with God, but also finding room for the prayer of intercession; for a reasonable God will have to respond differently to a situation in which prayer is present than he would to a situation from which it is absent.

Sixthly, from its general conception of religious values and from its belief in a good God, personalism infers that the human person is immortal. A good God could not destroy an intrinsic value, and persons are the only intrinsic values. Personalism does not attempt to speculate, in the lack of evidence, about the details of the future life, and it finds little coherence in the pretended evidence of spiritism. But I venture one suggestion. If the future life is to be good, it must be moral and rational; and if so, it must be developing, if there is any continuity between the life in this world and in the world to come. Too often, orthodoxy has adopted a perfectionistic or rigoristic ethics for this world, and a hedonistic ethics of eternal selfish enjoyment for the other world. If there be immortality, it cannot be one of mere pleasure; it must be work and service, if the values which cause us to believe in immortality are truly valuable.

The six points which have been discussed are far from

exhausting the personalistic philosophy of religion, but they bring out features which are perhaps less familiar than others which might have been mentioned. The personalistic account of the immanence of God in nature, and of evolution as the method of God in creation, has been so often stated as not to require repetition here.

In conclusion, let us consider briefly some of the criticisms directed against personalism. As was said at the outset of this paper, personalism has suffered from the tendency of its critics to ignore arguments and evidence and to jump at once to the conclusions. In fact, it may be said that personalism has never received a thorough and intelligent criticism. Yet, especially in the past few years, there has been an increasing willingness on the part of its opponents to acknowledge its importance and to state certain objections to it. In the main, these reduce to three: That it is too abstract and remote from experience, that it is too orthodox, and that it is absurd in its contention that only persons are real.

Is personalism too abstract and remote from experience? This objection comes partly from those who are unwilling to subject themselves to the discipline of any philosophical thinking and who would therefore raise the same objection to any philosophy whatever. Such objectors we may leave to perish in their sins. The same objection is, however, raised from another quarter. Many earnest Christian believers are suspicious of personalism because it does not include a complete Christian theology. They regard it as unhistorical because it does not appeal to the Scripture and to Christian doctrine as a ground of belief. Here is a real issue. Authoritarianism dies hard; but personalism believes that it ought to die. Also certain philosophers, like Dewey, with a highly technical view of experience, regard personalism as abstract; but, on the contrary, personalism builds on concrete, given experience, while the "experience" of Dewey is an artificial and abstract inference from the concrete personal self. Personalism is

not abstract; it is the concrete view of experience as a whole.

Is personalism too orthodox? The previous objection held that personalism is too little of a philosophy of religion; the present one holds that it is too much of the same! This objection is probably at the heart of most animosity against personalism. Personalism is supposed to be the rationalization of a desire that conventional religion be true. It is supposed to accomplish its end with so little trouble as to be what Professor Wieman has called a "Ford philosophy," although I should add that he has since admitted in conversation that the epithet is a hasty generalization. I must also admit that some followers of personalism defend it so emotionally and so uncritically as to give color to the suspicion that, in their case, their advocacy of the cause is due to their conviction that it is conventionally sound. But I wish to protest most vigorously against all such defense as well as against all such criticism of personalism. It is at least barely possible that so-called conventional religion, the religious experience of the main streams of religious history, may have more than a kernel of truth in it. But there is only one way to determine whether the personalistic account of religious truth is or is not valid; that way is not the hurling of epithets or the imputing of motives, but the examination of arguments. There is no logical force whatever in the argument that a belief must be false because it is conventional.

Finally, is it absurd to contend that only persons are real? When I hear this argument seriously urged, I wonder whether the objector has heard of the great historical arguments for idealism; and I wonder whether he understands the personalistic account of nature. Personalism certainly does not hold that only human persons are real; nor does it hold that trees and gold and skies are all persons. In Dewey's language (but not in his sense!) personalism holds that trees and gold and skies are all experience; yet not merely human experience, for

they exist when no human being is aware of them. Therefore, they are the experience of the Supreme Person. Personalism maintains that this hypothesis fulfils the function of philosophical thought in giving a unified world view, which is more intelligible and truer to the facts of experience than any other account which has been given. Hence, when this particular objection is raised, I want to know whether the objector understands the sense in which personalism holds only persons to be real, and also whether he is able not merely to pick flaws in particular arguments for idealism, but also to present a more intelligible and reasonable view. When that view appears, I shall welcome it. Meanwhile, I shall try the hypothesis of personalism.

# THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY IN PROTESTANTISM

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CATHOLICISM has no real problem of authority. The Church is organized to enforce the alleged decrees of God. The individual who defies the institution finds out that authority is a very real thing.

Protestantism, however, has insisted on the right of the individual Christian to interpret the Bible under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. No institution is recognized as superior to the Bible. No church can dictate to the individual what that individual shall discover in the Scriptures. In case two individuals—or two groups of individuals—differ in their interpretations neither can excommunicate the other. If a Protestant denies the authority of the Bible, the Bible lets him alone.

And yet Protestantism has retained the appeal to the authority of the Scriptures along with this right of private judgment. Much perplexity has resulted. It will not be amiss to look briefly at certain phases of Protestant history in order to see more clearly just what is involved.

## I. LUTHER'S POSITION

Luther never dreamed of denying the principle of authority. In his day every one took it for granted that the Bible was absolutely authoritative. It was only when Luther found that the Catholic Church was standing in the way of an effective preaching of the gospel that he was constrained to deny the right of the Church to be the interpreter of the revelation of God. It was in order to make that revelation more directly accessible that he asserted that every one, even

the " common man " or the " miller's maid," has as immediate a right to interpret the Bible as has the pope at Rome.

Nevertheless, the problem which was adequately met by the doctrine of the authority of the church remained a real problem. When conscientious Christians did not agree in their interpretations, who was to tell which was right and which was wrong? The Reformers were not quite ready to deliver the fate of religion over to the vagaries of men's differing opinions. They felt the need of a divine authentication of the interpretation of the Bible as well as of the Bible itself.

Now since God does not speak through the present corrupt Catholic Church, it was felt that men must look in another direction for the divine guarantee of Scripture. Hence arose the Protestant doctrine of the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit.[1] The Scriptures, it was assumed, were written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, so that the Bible is called God's word, in distinction to any other books. This divine word of God must be attested by God himself. But God does not speak through the Church. He speaks directly in the heart of the believer. Thus the Christian is free from the tyranny of any external authority, and yet at the same time can appeal to the authority of God himself. Luther could thus work unhampered by the Church as he strove to reform Christianity. His position was admirably suited to cut both ways. As against the oppression of an external institution he could appeal to the freedom of each man to be the bearer of the Holy Spirit. But if any one presumed to shake himself free from *all* external authority, Luther could say that the business of the theologian or preacher is not to set forth his own guesses at truth, but faithfully to reproduce the message of God contained in the Scriptures. We see that both tyranny and anarchy were thus avoided.

Calvin set forth the same doctrine in the famous seventh

[1] *Non ullorum auctoritate, sed spiritu solo Dei oritur in corde. . . Solus spiritus sanctus facit credere quemque.* See the *Resolutiones* following the disputation with Eck. W. A. II, 429ff.

chapter of the Institutes. The following sentences from that chapter will illustrate his position:

> Since we are not favored with daily oracles from heaven, and since it is only in the Scriptures that the Lord hath been pleased to preserve his truth in perpetual remembrance, it obtains the same complete credit and authority with believers, *when they are satisfied of its divine origin,* as if they heard the very words pronounced by God himself.—But men say, Who can assure us that God is the author of them?—It depends, they say, on the determination of the church.—But if this be true, what will be the condition of those wretched consciences which are seeking a solid assurance of eternal life, if all the promises extant concerning it rest only on the judgment of men? [For Calvin, the church has no divine authority. Its voice has been proved by history to be the fallible voice of human frailty.]—[Moreover, for the same reason] it is acting a preposterous part to endeavor to produce sound faith in the Scripture by disputations.—But I reply that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to all reason. For as God alone is a sufficient witness of himself in his own word, so also the word will never gain credit in the hearts of men until it be confirmed by the internal testimony of the Spirit. It is necessary, therefore, that the same Spirit, who spake by the mouths of the prophets, should penetrate into our hearts, to convince us that they faithfully delivered the oracles which were divinely entrusted to them.—Therefore, being illumined by the Spirit, we now believe the divine original of the Scripture, not from our own judgment, or that of other men, but we esteem the certainty, that we have received it from God's own mouth by the ministry of men, to be superior to that of any human judgment, and equal to that of an intuitive perception of God himself in it. (Italics mine.)

It is evident that the efficacy of the primitive Protestant idea of authority consists in keeping a proper balance between the outer authority of the Bible and the inner authority of the Spirit. The doctrine may be perverted in either direction. If the outer authority be emphasized at the expense of the vital inner approval of the Spirit, we should have a dead scholasticism. On the other hand, if the inner voice of the Spirit be emphasized at the expense of the letter of Scripture, we have uncontrolled subjectivism. This occurred in some of the eccentricities of certain Anabaptists and other radicals. In

view of these possibilities, it is important to examine the matter a little more closely, to see whether Luther gave to either of these two elements the preference.

So long as the chief enemy to be met was the Catholic church with its external authority, Luther was inclined to give very free scope to the inner authority of the Spirit. He ventured to alter the canon of Scripture, omitting certain books from the Catholic Old Testament, and recognizing degrees of authority in the New. The epistle of James he called an "epistle of straw." In making these revisions of the traditional conception of the Bible, he laid down the principle that authority resides in "*was Christum treibt.*" Whatever preaches Christ, he declared, is apostolic, no matter if it is proclaimed by a Judas or a Pilate. Whatever does not preach Christ is not apostolic even if it should be proclaimed by an apostle.[2]

It should be recognized, however, that this is not a purely subjective test. That which characterizes the Word of God is the objective fact that it "preaches Christ." It is a religious test, which can be applied by every disciple of Christ. To use Coleridge's expression, the Bible "finds" men whenever it preaches Christ. Luther always had in mind the objective gospel as the basis of this appeal. Thus even in his most subjective utterances, Luther maintained the primacy of the objective message.

This conclusion is confirmed if we look at Luther's idea of faith. According to him, faith can arise only when a man reads the objective promise of God in Scripture, and trusting to that promise, finds the forgiveness which is proclaimed. To allow the validity of the book in which the promises are recorded to be questioned would be to cut off the only support for faith. With all his emphasis on the necessity of an inner experience of the favor of God, Luther never for a moment taught that this assurance could be attained by mere mystic

[2] *Vorrede zum N. T.*, E. A. 63, 108ff.

contemplation. The objective promise must be there in the Bible and in the sacraments, and must be accepted as God's Word before the soul can find any basis of assurance.

Luther, therefore, put the outer authority of Scripture first. And when the excesses of the radicals who appealed to the inner authority of the Spirit aroused his opposition, he merely put greater emphasis on what was always in his mind. In reference to the preaching of Münzer, he said, "The final intention of the devil is to take away the entire sacrament and all external divine institutions, so that one shall gape inwardly with his heart alone on the Holy Spirit." [3] To expect to hear the voice of God by listening entirely or primarily to one's inner feelings is as vain as to expect to know the outer world by shutting one's eyes and dreaming. Luther formulated his position as follows:

> God deals with us in a twofold fashion: outwardly through the spoken word of the gospel (*mündliche Wort des Evangeliums*) and through physical signs (*leibliche Zeichen*), viz., Baptism and the Sacrament; inwardly through the Holy Spirit and Faith along with other gifts. But all this occurs in such a way that the outer element must precede, the inward must follow and be conditioned by the outer.

There is concealed in this plausible statement a difficulty which was not fully appreciated by Luther. He was sure that if one read his Bible seeking the guidance of the Holy Spirit, he would be assured that what he read was the very Word of God. He never really conceived the possibility that a genuinely conscientious person might doubt his primary premise. He believed that the authority of the Bible could remain intact so that the whole would be guaranteed by the Holy Spirit. Calvin, also, assumed that the inner voice of the Spirit will assure the believer of the authenticity of the entire Bible. This meant that confidence must be based on the authority of the Bible as such, not on a critical testing of each statement by itself. It was believed that the "whole" Bible would correct

[3] E. A., 29. 260.

any erroneous opinions derived from study of a *part* of the Bible.

Later Protestant orthodoxy saw clearly what this position involved. The inner voice of the Spirit must not be allowed to test the contents of the Bible, verse by verse. The authority of the Bible must be the authority of the entire book, from cover to cover. Luther had said, *Rund und rein, alles geglaubt oder nichts geglaubt,* thus anticipating the modern slogan, "Accept it all, or throw it all away." The later theologians, therefore, attempted to guarantee the total contents of the Scripture, by showing that the agency of the Holy Spirit required a theory of verbal inspiration. While arguments were indeed used to show the textual basis of the theory of inspiration, yet the real consideration in the minds of the theologians, and the response which they expected from their readers, was the *inner conviction* that the God who had been so merciful to men, could not possibly have expressed his will in anything less than an infallible text. It was possible under the thrill of this religious fervor, recognized as the voice of the Spirit, to say *a priori* just how God must have given his revelation to the world. One could even affirm the divine authenticity of the vowel points in the Massoretic text, and deny that the Bible contained any grammatical or rhetorical infelicities. In the same way, the limits of the canon were settled. It was assumed that the inner impression made by any portion of the Bible would be different from the impression made by any other literature. I do not mean to say that historical evidence was overlooked. By no means. This assumed constantly greater importance as time went on. But all the evidence of history was so manipulated as *to confirm the a priori decision due to the religious conviction that the doctrine of an infallible Bible must be true.* The work of scholarship consisted in removing objections to this religious conviction rather than in making an inductive study of the facts.

## II. The Dilemma of Later Protestantism

The essential foundation of primitive Protestantism was its rejection of any merely human authority. Because the Catholic Church was proved to be a mere human institution, its authority was denied. Luther was quite as hostile to worldly wisdom as to the Church. He denounced roundly the attempts of philosophers to fathom the secrets of the divine will. The natural reason, he declared, is the devil's seducer to lead men astray. Calvin declared that the conviction that the Bible is the word of God "must come from a higher source than from human reasons or judgments or conjectures." The original Protestant principle of authority is possible, then, only when the naive conviction of the infallibility of Scripture is present. If the Bible does not make its own impression of authority, the original Protestant position must be abandoned. To attempt to base a belief in the infallibility of the Bible on arguments means to put human reasoning before divine assurance.

And yet this is precisely what Protestantism was compelled to do.

We need not review in detail the circumstances which led to this development. It is enough to remind ourselves that the Reformation occurred at the same time that the new spirit of literary and historical criticism was taking possession of the thinking world. During the sixteenth century, the so-called Isidorian Decretals had been pronounced spurious. The accepted opinions of men in regard to the origin of books and documents were being critically examined in the light of the historical evidence. In the realm of astronomy, Copernicus and Galileo were suggesting a view of the universe directly opposed to that which Scripture was believed to teach. In 1670, Spinoza gave to the Pentateuch a critical examination, which resulted in the conclusion that Moses could not have been its author, at least in its existing form. From the seventeenth century on, the boldness with which scholars put forth views

which contradicted the teachings of the Bible became marked, until, as we know, in the next century scepticism as to the infallibility of the Bible was no uncommon thing.

What was the theologian to do? Here were respected scholars controverting the orthodox doctrine of the Scriptures. Evidently there was only one thing to do—to meet the scholars on their own ground, and to prove the authenticity of the Biblical books by an appeal to historical evidence. So it came about that in the treatises on theology, less space was given to the inner testimony of the Spirit, and more to the historical and scientific evidences of the truth of the Scriptures. Indeed, in the eighteenth century, there were found men who asserted that the content of revelation is in reality only the republication, in a clearer form, of the truths which natural reason, if not led astray, would affirm to be true. Out of this point of view arose the statement, so familiar in our day, "A thing is not true because it is in the Bible; it is in the Bible because it is true." Such a statement would have sounded strangely perverse to Luther. For him the promises of God were true because they were in the Bible, and there was no independent way of arriving at their truth, save by accepting them as the word of God and trusting to them.

But the modern Protestant is compelled to adopt the methods of scholarship, if he is to win the confidence of an age which believes in scholarship. Hence it is generally admitted that the authority of Scripture must be vindicated by human reasoning. This means that we must employ in studying the Scriptures those methods which scholarship approves in other fields. The results of this process of testing are today known and generally admitted. They have relativized the utterances of the Bible, putting these into relation with general conceptions of the world which seem to us crude and primitive. The statements of a Biblical book concerning scientific matters or concerning history are freely corrected by scholars. And it is not possible to isolate the religious

teachings of the Bible from the general views of nature and of God with which they are associated in the mind of the Biblical writer. For example, the eschatological views in the New Testament are frankly abandoned by many modern Christians. But this means that the theology of the New Testament is definitely revised. It is not possible to hold to the conception of a Bible which is *in toto* authoritative.

How keenly the situation is felt by those who hold to the primitive Protestant position may be seen by the fervent protests against " destructive criticism " which come from orthodox pens. It is pretty universally admitted that *scholarship* is essential to defend the faith. But it is insisted that this scholarship shall be " reverent," " constructive," " evangelical," and not " rationalistic " or " destructive." Behind all these vague words lies a very plain distinction. Is scholarship to take the position that what is in the Bible is true just because it is in the Bible? Will it devote its energies to a defense of Biblical doctrine? Then it is " constructive." Or is it to say, We will see whether a doctrine is true, regardless of the question whether it is in the Bible or not? If the Bible is found to affirm what is not true, we cannot help it. Such scholarship is " rationalistic " and " destructive "? But such distinctions are futile. We may as well recognize that if we appeal to human scholarship rather than to divine authority, we are abandoning the original Protestant position. Even if we substantiate the contents of the Bible by human scholarship, we are also abandoning the reformation principle. Whenever the Bible ceases to make on us the immediate impression of its divinity, when we have to be brought to a belief in its infallibility or its authority by the process of reasoning and scholarship, then we have substituted a mere human authority for the divine authority of Luther and of Calvin. Not human opinion, but the authority of God himself was, as we have seen, the bulwark of original Protestantism against both Romanism and rationalism.

## III. The Emphasis on the Authority of the Inner Light

As we have seen, the attempt to put the objective authority of Scripture foremost, and to maintain it in its integrity ended in subverting the Protestant principle of faith. After all, the only motive for asserting a divine authority is that the religious life of man may rest on a basis which is *felt* to be divine. Now if the theory that the authority of Scripture is supreme over that of the inner voice of the Spirit leads to unspiritual formalism, may it not be that to reverse Luther's estimate of the relative positions of the Scripture and the inner Voice will give a satisfactory solution of the problem?

The Quaker, Robert Barclay, has given us the classic example of this position. In 1685 he published his famous *Apology for the True Christian Divinity,* in which he set forth the principles and doctrines of the Quakers in opposition to the formal position of Protestantism in general. The second thesis of his book reads as follows:

> Seeing that "no man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son revealeth him"; and seeing the "revelation of the Son is in and by the Spirit"; therefore the testimony of the Spirit is that alone by which the true knowledge of God has been, is, and can be only revealed. . . By revelations of the Spirit God hath manifested himself to the sons of men, both patriarchs, prophets, and apostles; which revelations of God by the Spirit, whether by outward voices and appearances, dreams, or inward objective manifestations in the heart, were of old the formal object of their faith, and remain yet so to be; since the object of the saints' faith is the same in all ages. . . Moreover, these divine inward revelations, which we make absolutely necessary for the building up of true faith, neither do nor can ever contradict the outward testimony of the Scriptures or of right and sound reason. Yet from hence it will not follow that these divine revelations are to be subjected to the test, either of the outward testimony of Scripture, or of the natural reason of man, as to a more noble or certain rule and touchstone; for this divine revelation and inward illumination is that which is evident and clear of itself, forcing by its own evidence and clearness the well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly moving the same thereto,

even as the common principles of natural truths do move and incline the mind to a natural assent.

Barclay is here appealing to the inner life, as the primary source of authority. The Scriptures owe their existence to the activity of the Spirit. But the same Spirit speaks in the hearts of believers. Thus every man has immediate access to the Spirit, from whom the Scriptures are derived. It is better to listen to the immediate voice of the Spirit than to the mediated message of the Spirit in the Bible. In proposition III, we read:

> Nevertheless, because they [the Scriptures] are only a declaration of the fountain, and not the fountain itself, therefore they are not to be esteemed the principal ground of all truth and knowledge, nor yet the adequate primary rule of faith and manners. Yet because they give a true and faithful testimony of the first foundation, they are and may be esteemed a secondary rule, subordinate to the Spirit.

Barclay regards the inner Voice as an objective message from God, not as a phase of man's inner experience. In his estimation, one who appeals to the Spirit is appealing to the veritable word of God, immediately spoken. He frequently uses the word "objective" to characterize the Inner Light. And this inner guidance, coming as it does from God, is infallible.[4]

But as a matter of fact, Barclay could not deny that some persons who have claimed to be following the inner voice of the Spirit have held opinions which could not meet the approval of godly men. Does not this show that his theory of authority is wrong? To this he replies that Catholics, who hold to the objective authority of tradition, and Protestants who hold to the objective authority of the Scriptures have not enjoyed that unanimity of doctrine which, according to their theories, should follow the adoption of an external authority. If disagreement among those who hold to a given principle of authority is to

[4] "The object of faith, and revelation of the knowledge of God to every true Christian, is inward, immediate, and objective. . . For this Spirit never deceived us, never acted nor moved us to do anything that was amiss, but is clear and manifest in its revelations, which are evidently discerned by us, as we wait in the pure and undefiled light of God."

be a proof of the inadequacy of the authority, then both Catholics and Protestants have damned their authorities by the outcome in practical life.

> As for my part, as I have never a whit the lower esteem of the blessed testimony of the holy Scriptures, nor do the less respect any solid tradition, that is answerable and according to the truth, neither at all despise reason, that noble and excellent faculty of the mind, because wicked men have abused the name of them, to cover their wickedness, and deceive the simple; so would I not have any reject or doubt the certainty of that unerring Spirit which God hath given his children, as that which can alone guide them into all truth, because some have falsely pretended to it.

It is evident that this is a mere *ad hominem* argument and does not reach the real seat of the difficulty. It is conceivable that if all three theories of authority, Catholic, Protestant, and Quaker, alike fail in practise to do that which they in theory ought to do, all three alike must be adversely criticized. In fact, does not every one of these theories attempt to verify itself by refusing to allow any external verification? The Catholic makes the decrees of the church infallible, reformable only by the Church itself. The Protestant, while appealing to Scripture, requires the truth of Scripture to be verified by an inner Spirit which shall *a priori* declare all Scripture to be true. And how does Barclay outline the test of the true possession of the inner light? He says that the question, " How dost thou know that thou art actuated by the Spirit of God? " will appear to one who really has the Spirit as " a question no less ridiculous, than to ask one whose eyes are open how he knows the sun shines at noonday." But suppose a person wakes up in the middle of the night and insists that the sun is shining. What shall we do to him? And are there no persons who in the night of religious darkness are nevertheless insisting that they see the light of the sun?

Accordingly, Barclay, although he always maintains the priority of the inner light, asserts certain conditions to which

the Spirit will conform. The inner testimony of the Spirit will never contradict the message of the Spirit expressed in the Scriptures. Thus Barclay is perfectly willing that the Quaker doctrines shall be tested by their conformity to Scripture. Moreover the Spirit will never speak in contradiction to right reason. We thus have certain checks on the abnormal aspects of religious imagination. But the immediate vital conviction coming from the Spirit is always primary. It is the real basis of faith.

Only it is not merely the inner experience of *man.* Barclay conceived the inner voice of the Spirit as distinct from human opinions. It is objective, although it speaks in my consciousness rather than in an external fashion. The crucial question, then, is how this objective inner message can be distinguished from a merely empirical human consciousness. It *must* be so distinguished, or else we have no basis for an infallible divine authority. How is this distinction to be made? Evidently we must assert a miraculous affection of the inner life of man in contrast to the merely natural consciousness. Barclay makes this clear in his fourth proposition, in which he states that because of Adam's fall, man is

> deprived of the sensation or feeling of this inward testimony or seed of God. . . Man, therefore, as he is in this state, can know nothing aright; yea, his thoughts and conceptions concerning God and things spiritual, until he be disjoined from this evil seed, and united to the Divine Light, are unprofitable both to himself and to others.

It is only through the divine redemption, by which Christ comes to dwell within one, that the natural reason is supplanted by the divine inner light. Barclay clearly distinguishes this regenerate consciousness from the light of mere natural reason and from the natural testimony of conscience. Indeed, in the Cartesian terminology of the day, Barclay declares that the supernatural power which thus takes possession of a man is a " substance."

> We understand not this seed, light, or grace to be an accident, as most men ignorantly do (i. e., it is not a mere affection of man's consciousness), but a real spiritual substance, which the soul of man is capable to feel and apprehend; from which that real spiritual, inward birth in believers arises, called the new creature, the new man in the heart.

It is evident, therefore, that the appeal to the inner testimony of the Spirit is not by any means an appeal to "experience" in the modern sense of the term. It is an appeal to a supernatural message coming from an alien substance or power in the heart of man.

What has been the history of this attempt to locate authority in a psychological supernatural, rather than in a historical supernatural? Exactly as the progress of historical criticism has gradually broken down the barriers between sacred and secular history, so that the Bible is now studied by exactly the same laws and interpreted by exactly the same principles as any other literature, and the rigid distinction between the Biblical canon and other literature is no longer held; exactly so, the psychologists are breaking down the barriers between the regenerate and the unregenerate elements in consciousness. Professor James' book, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* is often taken by men of orthodox tendencies as a vindication of the genuineness of the experience of conversion. It nevertheless makes absolutely no distinction between the testimony of Protestant and Catholic, Christian and Buddhist. If Protestant religious experience demonstrates the reality of the inner voice, Catholic and Pagan religious experience demonstrate the same thing. In other words, either all religious experience is authority, or else none of it is any better than any other. At any rate, if the absoluteness of Christian experience is to be maintained over against the relativity of other types of religious experience, we have to call in reason or some other alien witness to make the distinction. Thus Barclay's position can be held only where there is a naive conviction concerning the possibility of distinguishing the presence of the Spirit from

the other aspects of consciousness. When this is doubted, as it must be doubted by one who studies modern psychology, the divinity of the inner consciousness in the absolute sense disappears.

## IV. Modern Protestantism

The whole difficulty in the positions which we have examined lies in the desire to have an absolute infallible declaration of divine truth. It represents a carrying over into Protestantism of the conception of dogmatic authority which Catholicism is organized to maintain, but for which Protestantism has no instrument of administration. It represents the attempt on the part of Protestantism to continue the conception of the validity of religion which constitutes the essence of the Catholic theology. According to that theology, man has no essential part in the making of true religion. God himself has established the one absolutely true form of faith. Man's part consists simply in accepting what is divinely given. Religious interpretation means the exposition of the faith once delivered to the saints. The content of that faith can be absolutely trusted just because it has been ordained by God.

It is clear that if *absolute* assurance is demanded, some such divine guarantee must be affirmed. One must be able to rest upon God's Word, not upon man's opinion. The Catholic Church has a system which enables it (theoretically) to keep the original deposit of faith intact. That faith was entrusted, not to men in general, but to the specially ordained apostles, to whom was given divine grace enabling them to interpret the faith aright. Always the voice of the Church is put above the opinion of any individual. And in the last analysis, the Church speaks *ex cathedra* through the pope, whenever that official speaks under the undoubted guidance of the Spirit in the exercise of the grace with which he is believed to be officially endowed. Here is real authority.

The fact is that Protestantism cannot make any valid

claim to such an authority. It has no apostolic priesthood to whom is entrusted the interpretation of the Bible. It has no apparatus for disciplining scholarship into acquiescence with the demands of dogmatic theology. Its attempts to maintain the principle of authority have resulted only in the multiplication of sects, not in the maintenance of an unchanged system. The original Protestant (and Catholic) conception of the nature of the Bible has been modified by scholarship. "Modernism" could be officially suppressed in Catholicism. Protestantism has only been rent by disputations over the movement, and has been unable to check its growth. The attempts of Protestantism to operate as a religion of authority have met with failure.

If the above analysis is valid, it points the way toward a procedure which will be in harmony with the genius of Protestantism. The primary interest of the Reformation was in vital personal religion. Luther staked his case on the declaration that religion finds its real vindication in the experience of living people rather than in the declaration of an official church. It is true that he pictured that experience in terms of the religious system with which he was familiar. But underneath his reform is the principle that practical vitality and efficiency are to be sought first. That which is inherently unbelievable or essentially immoral cannot be made sacred by any official decree of the Church.

Recent developments in Protestantism indicate that we are coming to accept and apply this principle. More and more our religious programs are being formulated on the basis of the ascertained needs of people rather than on the basis of alleged authoritative utterances. The distinctions between the denominations are being softened as all alike cease to urge their exclusive divine rights. There is a strong urge for the disappearance of the costly habit of dissipating the resources of a community in maintaining the overhead expense of a half dozen churches, poorly equipped and poverty-stricken, when

the same resources if unified and wisely administered, could commend religion in persuasive and helpful ways. The future of Protestantism lies in its frank acceptance of this test of vitality and efficiency. The Bible and the traditions of Christianity are more and more being used as incentives to a creative life of our own; and we are being set free to criticize and to reorganize our faith and our practise in any way which shall serve to bring men to a more profound experience of their religious privileges. In such a Protestantism, the problem of "authority" gives way to the more insistent question of religious vitality and efficiency.

# THE CHANGING CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE

CHARLES H. WATSON

In the terms of art, perspective is the effect of distance upon the appearance of solid objects that are drawn upon a flat surface. In the terms of life, perspective is the relative importance of facts, or considerations, from any special point of view. Change is the law of variation, alteration, substitution, by which matter, mind, and spirit are bound, from which but one being is free.

1. Christian perspective is the appearance of things as determined by their near or remote relations. It has to do with the comparative importance of Christian precepts, precedents, or practises; with the place of Christian symbolism as related to the facts or experiences which that symbolism declares or pictures; with the variant Christian organization developed, as compared with Christian life itself. It assumes that this life is a great new nature given to us, transcending in importance any or all of the various forms that it takes. In brief, Christian perspective would be the Christian outlook as determined by the Christian uplook; the things of God seen from the point of view of those who have "received the spirit of power, of love, and of a sound mind."

Nowhere has the law of change been more constantly operative than here. While this is beyond dispute, it is surprising that difference about it is so common. Disagreement about change in the perspective far exceeds debate about the everlasting and unchangeable. Always the things that wax old like a garment and are laid away, are honored with more struggle and sacrifice than that which from the beginning was destined to remain. In the nature of things, the final perspective will come slow, but it will come. Christian history, made within our recollection, shows that there is a recession of matters that have been kept obtrusively prominent quite out of

proportion to their importance: things that have wasted mind, strength, and spirit, and scarred the ages with unholy division and contention. They are disappearing as the weightier matters of the law appear in better focus and are seen to involve the greatest of all concerns—a personal God; an accountable man; a divine revelation; a manifested Redeemer and Lord; a great Catholic household of faith, hope, and love. As these great themes more and more absorb religious thinking and feeling, things incidental to them compel less attention.

2. What present indications have we that such changes are in progress? In a long individual experience, a man changes his mind and spirit, and discovers himself growing in graces and increasing in certified knowledge. In the change, his faith has gained clearness, strength, and proportion. Often the process seems quite apart from any purpose of his own to produce it. Inward experience and outward circumstance have quietly wrought together in the almost unconscious readjustment. Old things have passed away—behold, they have become new—and chiefly by a shift of place or emphasis. It has been a gradual process of becoming, like physical growth, that he could not have prevented, and would not if he could.

Is the analogy between such an individual experience and the free and advancing spirit of a Christian age permissible? It would seem so. May we look for similar readjustment in the aggregate Christian life in the world—increase of grace and nearer balance of truth? Without some such correction of proportion and perspective the world could not get on, and the world must get on. What this change emphasizes is not movement alone. Movement is not necessarily growth or progress. There is backward movement and movement in a circle. Yet by cycles of change the race has ascended, and reaction is a law of progress. To get the most wholesome indication of advancement, we have to set a higher moral ascension over against a reaction that does not dip lower into apostasy than the race has sometimes sunk in its great struggle for itself. We must

remember that when the nether brute in man is somewhere at its worst, somewhere else the ascendant angel in his breast has just risen to its best. Man long ago touched bottom in baseness, but none will say that he has made his highest seizure.

> Ah, but a man's reach will exceed his grasp,
> Or what's a heaven for?

These considerations make present indications of a changing perspective significant.

What are some of them? Of course, the "appearances" with which we have to do may, as the adage declares, "be deceitful." But this whole matter depends upon one's point of view, or upon the look of things to one witness. Eye-witnesses to the same transaction give amusingly different reports, yet courts of law continue to take testimony, and judges and juries keep busy sifting it, and rendering verdicts thereupon. In the wider survey of larger transactions, it is much the same; and we assume that there are competent judges, and intelligent juries, also corroborating witnesses, some of them prepared to give "expert testimony." We allow that there are other experts confidently ready to confound them. Yet back of all the "strife of tongues," in which much or little is made of what is being bruited, there is an element of unconscious onwardness. Divergent minds are in deeper agreement than they know. Conflict makes differences seem radical. Yet disputants in close grapple, giving and taking blows, will unconsciously fight toward a clearing, which they discover to be common ground.

a. Sensitiveness of men to truth and persistency of truth in men, comes to look like a new quality or combination. It is something like a movable stairway. All kinds of people get on and get up together. A persistent truth-movement goes on in us, of which we are unconscious, until its objective discloses to us a more Christian point of view. Then we see visions and dream dreams.

This fact and experience is put at the front of the indications of a changing perspective. It is easily first, for it is more than an appearance, it is a cause of change. It is so fundamental, so silently authoritative, that men do not proclaim it upon the housetops, neither do they strive nor cry, nor allow anything to gainsay its reality. They accept it as they accept manhood after youth, and then manhood's disenchantment that so quietly substitutes wisdom in the place of illusion. They are very sweet about it and very firm. Allow an illustration:

It was at the Baptist Congress—at the Providence meeting, 1895. The theme was the "Books of the New Testament in the Light of Modern Research." Two papers read by Doctor Nordell, and Doctor Evans of Crozer, neither of them at all radical, had led us out into the open. As Dr. Alvah Hovey, in the discussion following, came to the platform, some cautious corrective was expected by many. Instead, he disclosed what was virtually a changed perspective upon the whole subject. He declared it to be, in his opinion, a false principle, to assume beforehand that the teaching of Christ is a final and infallible standard, and that nothing must be accepted which cannot be tested and proved to be correct by what he said—that Christ himself declared that there would be another teacher, who would go farther than he had gone, enabling men to see things that they could not see by anything that he had said, or by anything he had not said because they could not understand him. It was clearly evident that Doctor Hovey was delivering himself of a slow-grown conviction, that was consciously changing his Christian perspective, for as he resumed his seat in the pew, with his most significant tone and smile he exclaimed to a few of us sitting near, "So we go!" He had been moved by his own receptivity, and by his own research to a point of view closer to the divine meeting, and he had declared it. The same hospitality of man to the truth, and the persistency of truth in the man whom the truth possesses, is an element in the silent forces of Christian progress; silent forces are the mightiest.

b. Another indication and cause of the unconscious movement we are considering, is proximity. Humanity is closing in. The ends of the earth are being tied. Self-consciousness and race-consciousness are giving way to world-consciousness. Units in the great mass of men are merging in an aggregate universal man. Races and nations are disclosing themselves as claimants of their portion of a common heritage. They are like separated members of a family, now brought together by invention and the annihilation of distance.

This change by contact is common. It is the growing consciousness of the whole, in each of its visible and component parts. It is a premonitory symptom of the ultimate Brotherhood of the Kingdom for which Christ prayed, and in which every brother race is to be included. We do well to trace it, and give it welcome, wherever its coming is indicated.

In the Christian world it is easily traced. Juxtaposition has become a sort of Christian consciousness. This consciousness makes comity easy, and isolation difficult. This comity takes us beyond mere civilities, and grows into exchange of gifts, and interchange of purpose and method. The interchange promotes union in larger Christian movements; avoidance of needless duplication of Christian enterprises; of overlapping as new fields are entered; economy in the planting and development of Christian schools and hospitals, through broader and more inclusive foundations. It is significant that upon mission fields in the largest continent, contiguity of Christian bodies is viewed as necessitating cooperation. For the sake of the Kingdom, this cooperation must strike a pace, and develop a cordiality that on our more cultivated home fields would seem hurried and premature. The signs are that we may best find our Christian latitude and longitude by studying the lay of the land in Asia. When Roman Catholic missionaries come to a general conference of Protestant mission bodies to get points on world evangelism, and to give them, it indicates that something has come which will make a " splendid

isolation" impossible, even to the Church of Rome, and in time will make that hierarchy more Christian, and thus help to mobilize all the Christian forces for world conquest.

c. The next indication and cause of a clearer and truer Christian vision, is the growing disposition to sacrifice the lesser to the greater. It is not so much a sacrifice, as the discovery that from the Christian point of view, sacrifice is not required. What is required is the recognition of the true place and proportion of things; seeing the less in comparison with the greater, and determining the relative proportions of both. It is the giving to the lesser its subordinate place, that we may get more completely under the power of the greater. It is making less of the image and more of the thing. It will result in the cultivation of a wholesome indifference about some things that is inevitable in all real discovery and growth. This indifference is the economy of Christian life and force. It saves from the waste of exaggerated interests, disproportional enthusiasm, exhausting conflicts with men of straw, and costly defeats by those sometimes too formidable adversaries. There are indifferences that are deadly, and indifferences that are wholesome. We are not necessarily blind to the former when we practise the latter. Besides, it is the latter that we are considering.

One of the signs that wholesome Christian indifference is more common, is the passing of small contests. They do not now enlist the kind of minds that they formerly engaged. There are fewer tempests in religious teapots than formerly. And the few more quickly cool for lack of attention. Once, you could split a conservative Back Bay church on the question of fermented or unfermented wine at the communion table, but not now. Once, the question of open or close communion tore through a South End church like a cyclone, but not now. Once, but not now, a Congregational missionary in India was sternly threatened with dismissal, because he declared that the mercy of God was not limited, but embraced heathen dying without

knowledge of its offer in Jesus, the Redeemer. That noble servant of God still honors Congregationalism and was a prophet fifty years in India. You could not now duplicate these contentions in such Christian bodies as once wasted their substance in the riot of them. There would be impatient turning away to the issues that are greater. We are becoming better Christian draughtsmen. The world and the flesh are sharp critics of the church in its squabbles, but everything at last helps the battle of the Lord, even to the stars in their courses. Suspicion, separation, and exclusion, no longer hold their proud place as the infallible Christian therapeutics. That they have been so dominant, only shows us that we had no perspective: that the whole Christian purview was like an old Japanese painting, in which everything was flat; and, there being no vista, a peacock could be bigger than a mountain. We had plenty of people in our churches, whose faith was simply an ingenious mechanical trap, and they were caught in it. It was so craftily constructed that not a nail in it could be spared without bringing the entire structure down upon them. Thus, they had to contend as earnestly for the nail, as for the foundation. There was no difference. More blood would be shed over a wafer, than Paganism would require of a Christian martyr who had refused a pinch of incense for its idol. We are now far removed from much of this. We have come to see that tolerance is Christian insight, and intolerance no better than Pagan diabolism; whether that intolerance be expressed in the sniffy contemptuousness of a sham spirituality, or in the overhasty exorcisms of a hyperliteralism. We have come to know that the distinction and the difference is fundamental, between the passion for a really Christian vision, and the lust that would merely cultivate a false intellectualism that becomes a noxious compound of self-importance and self-will. The one is the blessing of God—the other, the temptation of the devil.

But the entire matter is no question of liberalism or conservatism at all. It is a question of fact, of all-round Chris-

tian betterment and sweetening. We become blind to the suspected flaws in a man's thinking, as we love him for the soul of nobility that is in him. We jokingly call him a " moss-back " as we tie up to him. We facetiously dub him " heretic " as we lay a caressing hand upon his shoulder. Nearly every theological club will have men in its fellowship so inconsiderately radical that some wise Aquila ought privately to instruct them more perfectly in the ways of the Lord. At the same round table there is sure to be a man or two altogether too confident of their fitness to duplicate the Apostolical part. However, all this pleasant, and even intimate converse between theological extremes as now they meet, is convincing proof that we are gaining by our changing.

d. The last appearing cause of the change we are discussing is a growing Christian interest inside of each party, sect, and denomination. More and more, in each, is the Christian interest becoming the greatest. Strictly party or sectarian enthusiasms are becoming more difficult to arouse, while world-wide interests that are manifestly Christian kindle a great fire; and the several denominations warm themselves and feed the fire with the enthusiasm which it is kindling. We are refusing to count what we possess our own, in the growing consciousness of a great common property right, that becomes the larger joy of all bodies alike. It is a new communism on a Christian scale that would have no part of the great world outside of its operations.

The common confession of all missionary bodies is, that the greatest interest now is Christian, and that the supreme obligation of each is to realize it, and magnify it. The federation movements in this and other lands are significant—the closing in of denominational groups that long ago were split apart by exaggerated differences—which differences now have disappeared in the realization of larger Christian agreements. All the impulses in the modern world are toward comprehensive interests and their achievements in permanent constructiveness,

withdrawing themselves from mere provincialism, exclusiveness, and the spirit that levels and never builds.

Christian churches are sharing the same tendency under the spell of a chief interest that ultimately will make them more Christian. This interest will win back to organized Christianity the classes that petty and futile differences have either driven out or kept out of the fellowship. It is the Christian spirit dominating religious thinking and feeling that has caused a change of place, emphasis, or conception of some of our essential doctrines. It has helped us really to possess our Bible —taking away its unreality and making it a more intelligible revelation of the will of God through the spirit that can most truly interpret it. It is restoring the divine accentuation to the righteousness which is the expression of faith, saving us from mere faith-expressions that may be unrelated to the obligations of justice and love. It is increasing the insistence upon that which God requires: not Phariseeism, or Scribalism, or ceremonialism, or any other greater or lesser " isms," but judgment, mercy, and faith, which in our occupation with " mint, anise, and cummin," we had failed to give their true place or importance. We shall be helped and not hindered in gaining our Christian perspective by this insistence.

There is a potency in the truth adrift in human consciousness, which reminds one of the germ-plasms of the Cosmos. The evolution may be slow, but it is certain. We have lived to see Christian idealism slowly penetrating the subspirituality of the world. It is an atmosphere, if not yet a climate. Christianity is quietly "making good," in spite of the obstinate corruption of our nature. If it were not so, man would be unfortunate in two rather important things—his life and his death; for there would be no hope for him in either. But now, he is finding God, and finding his brother also. He is conscious that God is finding him. The old catechism confidently declared that " the chief end of man was to glorify God and enjoy him forever." The new catechism may as confidently add that the chief end

of God is to glorify man and enjoy him forever. Man's Christian perspective is opening into infinite distances, and as it adjusts itself to the complete redemption received, yet in its fulness still expected, types of religious character will also change. The saint of tomorrow will have the modern insistence upon efficiency. Every age puts its own brand upon its sages. The seal of our new century is the one set upon us by our materialism. It is the stamp of efficiency—emphasis upon the power to brings things to pass. In that classic of religious devotion of Thomas á Kempis, every appeal is to the subjective life. Now, the challenge of the world is to the objective life, and a man must make his duty his sacrament. He himself is what his work is. Whether he does it with the quietness and expectation of the scientist, or with the exaltation of the Crusader, he must have the constructive elements of statesmanship; for he has the world-consciousness, and his work must be as large as humanity itself. His faith must be a mental habit, and be beyond question; to be maintained at any cost, like chastity and honor; for he knows the awful peril of the tragic doubt that dooms not only individuals, but nations and races.

He will forgive his brother with an "opinionated conscience," almost as gently as the one with no conscience at all. And, more than the unsepulchered bones of past creeds, will he dread the death blight of indifferentism. That is "death of death and worst destruction." The alarm sounded by Browning, Swinburne, and Matthew Arnold, rings in his heart; that callousness and self-righteousness devastate a commonwealth faster than crime; and that the world's idolatry of shams, and man's sinister passion for theories, can make, even of the gospel of Christ, a mere icon or plaything, or an insignificant something or other, akin to the silk-spun philosophies, which are always appearing, and always winding themselves up for the cabinets of scholars.

Faith is not a wistful dream of fearful souls: it is a burning inner life, aggressive, triumphant, giving the peace of dis-

cipleship, and the energy to do, rather than merely to describe, imagine, or desire. It is the dynamo of the future. In that future, the real authority of our divine Saviour is not to be established merely by script, or tablet, but by the constancy of ascending human progress, by the company who reach out to follow on more perfectly to "apprehend that for which they also are apprehended."

This is what Paul describes as the action of the resurrection power. It is that power that preeminently fits a man both to witness to Christianity and to propagate it. Such worthy witnesses will best illustrate the changes that will appear as Christianity more completely discloses herself, and passes on to her ultimate triumphs.

# THE BAPTIST ATTITUDE TO THE OLD TESTAMENT

Professor I. G. MATTHEWS

Two subjects, each of the deepest personal interest to the writer, are here conjoined: the Old Testament and Baptists. But how are they joined? What relation has the one borne to the other in history? is the theme of this paper. The answer depends largely on definition. Who have been and who are the Baptists? If there is such a species, and that word is no more definitive in religion than it is in biology, then there must be many varieties. Calvinistic and Free-will, Hard-shell and Open-communion, General and Particular, Old-school and New-light, Landmarker and Missionary, Six-principle and Seventh-day, Regular and Bible Baptists and a legion more, each with its peculiarities, emerge during the period of our study. Marked differences, again are found when we compare American groups and English groups and Continental groups. With great fundamental principles binding these all together in a real spiritual unity, there are many points of divergency. The peculiarities of each group will in no place be more noticeable than in their attitudes toward and their use of the Scriptures, especially the Old Testament.

Reasons for such divergencies lie as much in the nature of the Old Testament itself as in any individual feature in any group of Christians. The Old Testament had its origin in Palestine and was written in Hebrew. Hence its similes and symbols, its illustrations and customs, all its undertones and nuances are far removed from our ordinary Western expressions. The whole texture of life is not only Oriental but it is ancient. The social organization and the problems relating thereto, the economic conditions and the national relationships lie back in that ancient world of two thousand years ago. Further it is a Jewish book. Jewish chronologies and Jewish

genealogies abound. Ritual, like that connected with the red heifer and the scapegoat, the determining of leprosy or the chastity of a woman, that originated in magical practises and had long ceased to be important even to the Jew, occupies a rather large place in the Old Testament writings. Laws once binding on the faithful, as a Sabbath Day's journey, the reading of the Law by the king once a year, the keeping of the New-moon festival, can now have no significance to any group of Christians. A Jewish book, why should any Christian in the twentieth century in America pay any attention to it from other than antiquarian or classical interests?

## I. Jesus' Attitude toward the Old Testament

History and content may help to throw light on the question under discussion. History opens to us some most illuminating pages. The first is the attitude of Jesus to the Old Testament. It was his book, and in it he found a divine revelation. He never discounts it but always finds in it the higher values. Unlike the Pharisees, who were a people of the book, he is not bound by the letter of the law. There was a higher law than the technical Sabbath observance (Mark 2: 27) and many of the ritual regulations had only a very secondary significance to him (Matthew 23). Regulations in the Old Testament, like divorce, might be temporal and not the highest ideal (Matthew 5: 31, 32). He recognized that the Old had its limitations owing to human frailty, but nevertheless it was the vital, life-giving word from the Father to his children. Professor J. R. Sampey expressed the attitude of Jesus to the Old Testament very vividly when he said, " The imperfections of progressive revelation, due to the errors of sinful man, did not disturb Jesus." (*Watchman-Examiner,* 1921, p. 684.) The fact, that the Old Testament was the only religious book Jesus had, that he appealed to it alike in controversy and for consolation, and that from it he drew for his ethical and spiritual teaching is of the greatest importance to the Christian church.

## II. Early Christianity's Attitude toward the Old Testament

Likewise the early Christians had no other book. The New Testament statements that touch the question of inspiration all refer to the Old Testament and the Old Testament exclusively. Those passages that speak of the "holy scriptures," as Romans 1:2, Hebrews 1:1-3, can in no possible way have any reference to the New Testament. The same is true of 2 Peter 1:20, 21, and likewise of 2 Timothy 3:16. In these passages we have the tacit acceptance of the Jewish doctrine of inspiration, and the Jewish evaluation of the Old Testament, even if the literalistic method of interpretation was not accepted. Peter's sermon at Pentecost (Acts 2:14-26) and Stephen's sermon a little later (Acts 7:2-53) are both rehearsals of Old Testament story with appeals to the Old Testament revelation. The author of Hebrews links himself up genetically with ritual, while the apostle Paul lays his foundations in the Old Testament in order properly to ground the new religion of Jesus the Messiah. This consistent New Testament testimony to the value of the then Scriptures cannot be neglected.

The same fact faces us in the days of the beginning of the church. The Old Testament was their book. Christianity was only one of the sects of Judaism, clinging closely to the synagogue till 70 A. D. Not till 135 A. D. was there a final separation from the parent religion. By this time all the New Testament literature had been written, though some of it must have been quite recent. Most of these letters were of merely local interest and none were canonical. So for a hundred years after the death of Jesus, the Old Testament was the only sacred Scripture the young religious brotherhood had in their possession.

In the middle of the second century A. D. an attack was made on the Old Testament by Marcion who soon allied him-

self with the Gnostics. In opposition to the Old Scriptures he selected a new canon, consisting of parts of the Gospel of Luke and Paul's epistles. This was the emergence of a New Testament canon. The pioneer for such was a heretic and was excommunicated from the Church. But the idea was in the air and by the end of the second century there was a growing recognition of the place and function in religious life of most of those books that we now look on as the New Testament. It would be regarded as a conservative statement that it was not till the beginning of the fourth century, that is nearly 300 years after the time of Christ, that there was general acceptance of the New Testament canon. Even then the Old Testament was held to be at least on a par, in most parts of the Christian world, with the New. This is an impressive page of history. The first 300 years of Christian history, years so formative and so vital, gave in its thinking and in its teaching the place of supreme honor to the Old Testament.

The same influences that led to the canonization of the New Testament Scriptures led to other significant developments in the field of ecclesiastical organization. The Church had become a well-organized body with its bishops and its dioceses. A fine structure was developing almost parallel with Roman administration. The Holy Scriptures, Old and New Testaments, became the inheritance of the Church, and the ecclesiastical leaders became the lawful interpreters thereof. Hence the Roman Catholic Church not only holds both the Old and the New Testaments as canonical, that is, authoritative, but also holds the right of interpretation. Among them there is no problem such as ours.

## III. Baptist Origins

But now, if we can use the term Baptist, what is the Baptist attitude? Two preliminary facts face us. The first is that notwithstanding the various divisions there is a general agreement in the general body. Very definite principles have for a

long time united in strong bonds those known by the name of Baptist. Separation of Church and State was in early history foremost. Personal suffering at the hand of State-Church officers led to clear-cut expression. Allied to this were two other principles; the one, the repudiation of infant baptism, which was a State-Church rite and conveyed Church-State privileges. The other was the demand for liberty of conscience. In order to support these contentions, appeal, as in all religious bodies on religious questions, was made to Scripture. Then came the doctrine of the adequacy of Scripture, a Reformation apologetic, which with various developments has been held by the Baptists. If the doctrine of Scripture came latest chronologically, it is not therefore of less importance than the others. Sometimes indeed it is emphasized to the exclusion of some of the others.

The second preliminary fact is, that there is little value to be derived from a search for our ancestry earlier than A. D. 1600. It is true that many of the small dissenting bodies from early days down have expressed more or less clearly one or more of those principles that are now distinctive badges. There have been those who have pled for democracy, have preached justification by faith, have struggled for a pure church life, have resented the arbitrary authority of magistrates and the tyrannizing power of the hierarchy, both within and without the Church. But the existence of a continuous organization holding cardinal Baptist emphasis would be difficult to find. Even those groups differ from us more than they resemble us. It is now generally admitted that Baptists emerge between A. D. 1610 and 1640.

If we admit this recent origin, we must nevertheless find their roots in the soil of antiquity. Signs heralding their coming may be detected centuries before their appearance. They came out of the ferment of the reform period. They were part of that long and growing reaction against the tyranny

and corruption of mediæval ecclesiasticism. The New Learning had awakened the common man to his intellectual heritage. The rise of national consciousness was reacting against any outside interference, even in affairs religious. The corruptions of certain of the officials aroused a storm of protest within the organization. The economic promise and glamor of new worlds to settle added to the ferment. Society was upset. New groups and new alignments were forming, and individuals had the opportunity of expressing themselves.

In this welter of human forces, at play for some five hundred years, out of which came the Protestant Reformation and the equally significant Counter-Reformation, we find the Anabaptists and the Mennonites, the most radical of the reformers, coming into existence. These were the more immediate kith and kin of our own body. They represent one of the spiritual movements of the day and had made great strides in their religious thinking.

## IV. Anabaptist Attitude toward the Old Testament

The attitude of the Anabaptists toward the Scripture may be briefly summarized. One group, led by Rothmann, and represented largely by the Munsterites, insisted on obedience to the letter of all Scripture. None of the Old Testament was in any way superseded. All its institutions remained in full force. So when they established the New Jerusalem at Münster, it was established on the model of Scripture. They had their twelve elders and their twelve tribes, and later under the stress of a peculiar social-economic situation they practised polygamy. To them this was easily defended as part of the divine economy.

This was a small and historically unimportant group. Led by two or three who ultimately became fanatical they unfortunately led the Münster community into excesses. Their underlying conception, the immediacy of the millennial kingdom, a reaction against oppression, and the literal authority of

the Old and the New Testaments, has appeared sporadically both earlier and later. At no time has it represented the most alert or the most active element in the Christian community.

Most Anabaptists, however, differed radically from these. One important body, the Socinians, insisted that the Old Testament had no authority in itself. It had value for illustrative and devotional purposes. It depends on the New Testament for its authorization. In much the same light most of the Anabaptist leaders viewed the relation between the two Testaments. They asserted the superior authority and sanctity of the New over the Old. It was the later, the fuller, and the clearer revelation of God. Pfeister Meier spoke for a multitude when he declared, "I obey that in the Old Testament, which I find confirmed in the New."

Along with this we find over and over again the clear conception of a progressive revelation in the Old Testament. They conceived it represented only the early stages of the divine revelation that was completed in the New. Hebrews 1: 1-3, is found frequently in their confessions and statements.

Related to their idea of Scripture was their doctrine of the "inner light." The spirit of truth was the possession of each believer. Hence each one had the power and the right of individual interpretation. Some of them went farther, as when the Anabaptists of Lichtenstein affirmed that the Holy Scriptures were not given to believers but to the godless, that they might be overcome. On the whole these Anabaptists living in an era of turmoil, led by men of profound religious intuition and of great fearlessness, made a lasting contribution to the religious life and thought of later centuries.

## V. Mennonite Attitude toward the Old Testament

The early Baptists were immediately indebted to the Mennonites who were the preservers of the principles of the Anabaptists. The Mennonites consistently refused to have

creeds or even confessions. Yet such were the times that their leaders in Holland were under the necessity of carefully tabulating their convictions. The most important of these, so far as Baptists were concerned, was the statement made in 1580 by Rys and Gerritz. These two were pastors in Holland, and they united in expressing their views. No doubt this statement represented that of a considerable number if not the majority of the Mennonites then living in Holland. In this elaborate confession there are 39 articles. It is noteworthy that the Holy Spirit is frequently mentioned, but there is no reference to the "inner light." In regards to the Scriptures there are two noteworthy features. The first is that the Mosaic Law is considered abrogated (art. x), progressive revelation is assumed (art. xi) and it is asserted that,

> The doctrine which ordained ministers propose to the people ought to be or to agree with that which Jesus brought from heaven. . . It, as much as is necessary for salvation, is contained in the books of the New Testament to which we join that which is found in the canonical books of the Old Testament and which is consonant with the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles and in accord with the administration of his spiritual kingdom (art. xxix).

The other important fact is that quotations for proof of doctrine are brought from the Old and the New Testaments promiscuously. Thus with the full recognition of progressive revelation there was no well-ordered conception of the differing values of different sections of Scripture. The proof-text method, which we know so well, was the only known method of building up doctrine.

## VI. English Baptists' Attitude toward the Old Testament

The first English Baptist confession, written in 1610, signed by John Smith and 41 others, was directly influenced by this confession of Rys and Gerritz. To all intents and purposes Article xxvii is identical with Article xxix of the above

as quoted. Thus our earliest statement of the Baptist position is strong in its emphasis on the New Testament and on the idea of a progressive revelation.

The following year, 1611, we have another confession, under the influence of Helwys, a friend of Smith. This was the result of some antagonism and shows a quite different attitude to a number of important questions. Helwys was an English gentleman, a layman, trained for the bar. Here we have the reaction of an Englishman and a layman. He is timid about approaches to any religious group on the Continent. The Dutch were then the chief commercial rivals of the English. He is conservative in his attitude toward the written Word. As a man of the law he has no fear of the law. Article xxiii is the crux of the matter concerning our topic. It reads, " That the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are written for our instruction, and that we ought to search them, for they testify of Christ. . ."

This is a marked departure from the earlier position and shows the work of a lawyer rather than a prophet and betrays the dominant note in Protestantism of that period, Calvinism. This is Calvin's doctrine of Scripture and not that of the Anabaptists or the Mennonites. Is the change toward the life of the Spirit or is it toward a legalism?

This, however, set the pace for English confessions. The Calvinistic confession published on behalf of the seven congregations in London in 1644 is more confirmed in its failure to recognize any distinction between the two books. They are simply called the canonical Scripture and the Word of God. Criticism also brought out the fact that some were in those days denying the Old Testament and in a letter appended to the second edition they stoutly affirmed among other things that they were not guilty of denying the Old Testament.

The Somerset confession, published in 1656, which was for the purpose of showing that those General Baptists who lived in Somerset and adjacent counties were in agreement with

the churches in London, especially in respect to Calvinism, places the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments together without any discussion (art. xviii).

Then in 1677 came the first edition of the most important of all English Baptist confessions. It was a confession of faith first put forth by the Elders and Brethren of many congregations of Christians (baptized on a profession of their faith) in London and the country. Representatives of more than a hundred congregations gave their approval to it, in an assembly in London in 1689, since which time many new editions have appeared. It was published for the express purpose of giving information to those who did not thoroughly understand what their principles were, or had entertained prejudices against them by reason of strange representation of them, etc. For its origin it claimed to be based on the Calvinistic confession of the seven churches of London, published in 1644. This is quite correct, yet the thirty intervening years, years of revolution and the crystallization of religious opinion, certainly left their impress on a religious body so wide awake as the Baptists. The Westminster Confession of faith, sturdiest of all confessions, had been published in 1648. The Cromwellian protectorate was established in 1649. With the restoration in 1660 the hopes of toleration seemed bright, the Act of Toleration being passed in 1689. So Protestantism, if sane and loyal to English interests, seemed about to reap the fruitage of a long and painful season of struggle.

The Baptists were wise in their day and generation. They built on the confession of 1644, which was Calvinistic and so was in tune with the great body of English Protestant thought. But even more important than this to the organization and attitude of the new confession was the Westminster Confession. In fact, this was taken as the Baptist model. Thus they fell in step, or perhaps we should rather say, were in step with the Protestant thinkers and leaders of England at that time.

In this confession, following the order of the Westminster

one, article i deals with Scripture. The place and value of Scripture is no longer assumed, it is asserted and becomes the foundation of all following doctrines. This is logical even if it is *a priori,* and is Calvinistic. The topic is treated with commendable fulness. Ten subdivisions treat the various possible aspects of Scripture. But always it is the " Holy Scriptures," the " Word of God," the " Word," the " Truth," and " all the books of the Old and New Testament." These are the infallible rule of all saving knowledge and they declare His will to the Church. They are the whole counsel of God . . . unto which nothing at any time is to be added. The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself. It is the supreme judge in all controversies in religion.

Two features relieve the situation somewhat. In Article xix, in discussing the Law of God, there is the recognition that the ceremonial laws of the Old Testament were appointed only to the time of the reformation and are by Christ . . . abrogated and taken away. The other is the function of the Holy Spirit illuminating to the saving understanding the things revealed in the Word. But neither concerning the Old Testament nor the leading of the divine Spirit is there anything so clear as in the Anabaptist confessions. Our forebears were either strongly influenced by the dominant notes of the day in their own thinking, which was perhaps the case, or they may have judiciously avoided difficulties in a period of crisis.

Even to a greater degree is the same thing true of the " Orthodox creed " drawn up in 1678 and signed by a group of messengers representing churches in Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire, and adjoining counties, for the purpose of uniting all Protestants against the errors and heresies of Rome. Article xix, which deals with the Scripture, concludes, " Thus the Old and New Testaments, like the faces of the Cherubim, look one toward another, and hold forth the self-same gospel, salvation to them and to us." Significant also is a statement in Art. xxxvii:

By the Holy Scriptures we understand the canonical books of the Old and the New Testament, as they are now translated into our English mother-tongue . . . All these are given by the inspiration of God to be the rule of faith and life.

But the confession of 1677 is the one that held sway in English Baptist life and thought. Two hundred years old, it has not been revised though often republished. Naturally it has been falling into disuse. When in 1888 it was brought before the Baptist Union for reaffirmation, the Union refused to do so. Two hundred years had produced a change in their thinking of the religious leaders. What is their attitude toward the Old Testament and toward the inner light, are questions that can only be answered, by the study of publications other than confessions.

## VII. American Baptists' Attitude toward the Old Testament

But it is the attitude of the American Baptists toward the Old Testament that is our chief interest. The story is much briefer. They were immediately and definitely related to their English brethren till 1776. In all there have been but two important confessions by the American group. The first was the Philadelphia Confession first adopted in 1742 which merely added two articles to the second edition of the 1677 English confession. These two articles grew out of purely local conditions; the laying on of hands as an ordinance, and the singing of praise, Psalms, etc., as a holy ordinance. Hence the attitude to the Old Testament was unchanged.

The New Hampshire Confession, the work of a committee of three, of which J. N. Brown was the most ardent worker, was in process of gestation from 1830 to 1853, and while adopted by many individual churches as an adequate general statement of their faith, was never affirmed by any convention. In respect to the Scripture, it is a condensation of the two-hundred-year-old confession with a few phrases that reveal local

American situations. It is bald and dogmatic, with no note of discrimination. It reads like a scribal summary of a living past that has become static. It has fine phrases, that catch the ear and appeal to the imagination, but on analysis, in some respects it fails to win the approval of intelligence. Concerning the Scripture and the Holy Spirit, it is quite unconscious of the throbbing religious life of more than a century.

The latest of our confessions, shall we stop there? To do so would be to omit one of the most dramatic incidents in our history as a people. Between 1853 and 1922 much water had flowed under the bridge. The inductive method of research and the comparative study of documents had become universal. Assertions based on *a priori* assumptions are no more tolerated today than are the endless dialectics of a century ago. Great schools had been founded and great teachers have lived and labored in our midst and not in vain. Hackett and Broadus, Northrop and Anderson, Strong and Clarke, Harper and Foster have been names with which to conjure. These men and others not less worthy have molded generations of preachers. They taught them to endeavor to think God's thoughts after him. They introduced them to thorough methods of study and opened up to them avenues to information of which their ancestors never dreamed. These preachers, and what a galaxy! have endeavored to lead their people into the largeness and into the freedom of the Truth as it is in Jesus. The Bible, Old Testament and New Testament, has been used and interpreted as never before. The results of the historical method have percolated down to the humblest hamlet in our brotherhood, to the great enrichment of the spiritual life and to a more correct appreciation of the varying values of Scripture.

This, surely not anything more superficial, was the underlying cause of memorable statements and a memorable decision of the Northern Baptist Convention in Indianapolis in June of 1922. In looking over all the records of the Fundamental Con-

ference that preceded the convention, I can find but little that would align any one with the confession of 1677. Dr. O. W. VanOsdel is the only illustration, and he goes too far. He insists that there must be unqualified obedience to the very letter of the Bible, whether of the Old or the New Testament. In fact, he proceeds, unless we can endorse the Bible as inerrant, infallible, authoritative, and make that our only standard of belief and practise, then the case is hopeless. But in the same address he asserts, "Unless our people can agree on a constitution—a fundamental law, and that the New Testament —our case is hopeless" (*Watchman-Examiner,* 1922, p. 777). Even this doughty champion has been affected by the theological movements, and apparently would not support the New Hampshire Confession. Nor could he very well live with the Christians of the first three centuries.

Without quoting others, suffice it to say that throughout the sessions of this Fundamentalist Conference, the changes were rung on the New Testament, and the New Testament church; phrases both of which belong to the newer generation.

But the crystallization not only of a few years of earnest discussion, but it seems to me of a long period of fermentation and of growth, came when the vote was taken on the substitute motion, to the affirmation of the New Hampshire Confession. This may in part have been the registration of party feeling. It may have been the declaration that the Baptists were more interested in the practical things of the kingdom than in the theological. But the conviction grows that it was an intelligent appraisal of New Testament values as over against any confession and as over against the Old Testament. The words of the resolution presented by Dr. Cornelius Woelfkin are most memorable: "Resolved that the Northern Baptist Convention affirm that the New Testament is an all-sufficient ground for Baptist faith and practise, and we need no other statement." This was carried by 1,264 votes to 637. It is brief but comprehensive and for its purpose a satisfactory statement of prin-

ciple. In Baptist annals we would not be surprised if it should gain a place of importance similar to that of Lincoln's Gettysburg speech in the nation's history.

## VIII. Conclusions

Yet questions of serious import are raised. As the ground of faith and practise is the New Testament inclusive and exclusive? Does it include all that belongs to our faith and practise? Our organization of the local church and of the denomination at large can find but a very precarious support in the New Testament *ipsissima verba.* All of the New Testament incorporated into our praxes? The holy kiss, women forbidden to speak in public, women wearing veils and long hair and subject to their husbands, and celibacy preferable to the married state—are we eager to insist on these as part of our Christian duty or ideal?

Nor can the New Testament be the ground of our faith and practise, exclusive of all else. The growing life of the centuries has not only created needs but also ways and means to meet those needs. The Spirit that was to lead into all truth did not complete his mission with the apostolic group. Interpretation of the fundamental principles has always been needed. Where there has been creative vigor there has ever been the adaptation to environment. So the New Testament seed has grown into the plant of Christianity and is unfolding the flower that lay dormant within the seed.

But we must reach backward as well as forward, and be familiar with the roots as well as with the blossom. So far as the affirmation states the Old Testament goes into the discard. It has not even received honorable mention. But the New Testament cannot be understood apart from that religious experience and hope that laid its very foundations and is now preserved in the Old. A progressive revelation found its fruition and glory in the New. More important than the knowledge of environment is the knowledge of heredity. If you

want to know a woman get acquainted with her grandmother. The germ cell transmits its qualities and peculiarities down to all generations. Hence the Old Testament, a Jewish book, with many imperfections, is nevertheless fundamental to the New Testament and to the correct appreciation of our faith and practise.

We might go further and intimate that the neglect of it would greatly handicap us and weaken our ministry. The man who is not familiar with the great burning messages there, is surely at a loss. The thrilling proclamation of Hosea of the love of God for a wayward people, the song of penitence in the Psalms, the social decalogue of Zechariah, the new covenant of Jeremiah, or the pungent expressions of social righteousness in so many of the prophets, are worthy of being placed alongside of the most profound statements of the New Testament. The heroism and the devotion of such Spirit-led men as Amos and Isaiah, Jeremiah and Nehemiah, command the attention of the pious reader as truly as even that of the great apostle to the Gentiles. The abiding hope of the coming of the kingdom, with its ever-changing expressions, figures of speech and symbols, its growing ethical and spiritual idealism, and the unshakable confidence in its reality, these have in them as much of light and leading as have the apocalyptic hopes of the New Testament writers.

With the affirmation of 1922 by the Northern Baptist Convention we find no fault. It is general, and can not be inclusive or exclusive. It must be interpreted in the light of history and by the Christian conscience. Especially for the understanding of the New Testament do we need a knowledge of that progressive revelation found in the Old Testament which was its preparation and foundation.

# PRINCIPLES OF THE EARLY BAPTISTS OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA

Professor R. E. E. HARKNESS

It is generally accepted today as a well-authenticated fact, established after the most careful and exhaustive investigation and research on the part of eminent historians [1] of the past and present generation, that English-speaking Baptist churches had existed some thirty-three years before they adopted immersion as the true Scriptural form of baptism. The first Baptist church composed of English people was organized by John Smyth in 1608 at Amsterdam, Holland. Immersion, however, was not practised by any English Baptist church until it was adopted by a group in London in 1641. The purpose of this paper is to enquire into the distinctive principles of some of these churches both prior to and immediately succeeding the adoption of this form.

## I

According to the well-known story, which must here be very briefly sketched,[2] John Smyth, a Cambridge man, and city preacher in Lincoln in 1600, forsook the Church of England and became pastor of the Separatist church at Gainsborough in 1605 or 1606. Under the pressure of persecution, "and malice of their adversaries," they left England one year later and settled at Amsterdam, Holland, forming the second English church in that city. Here, due perhaps to the influence of the

[1] Burgess, Walter H., *John Smith, Thomas Helwys, and the First Baptist Church in England.*
Burrage, Champlin, *The Early English Dissenters.* Two Vols.
Dexter, H. M., *The True Story of John Smyth.*
Lofton, George A., *English Baptist Reformation, from 1609 to 1641.*
Newman, A. H., *A History of the Baptist Churches in the U. S.*
Scheffer, J. De Hoop, *History of the Free Churchmen, etc.*
Vedder, H. C., *A Short History of the Baptists.*
Whitley, W. T., *A History of British Baptists.*
Whitsitt, W. H., *A Question in Baptist History.*

[2] For a more complete study, read: Burgess, Burrage, and Scheffer for sources, and Vedder for secondary authority. An early Baptist historian is Crosby, Thomas, *The History of the English Baptists.* 1738.

Mennonites, he and his followers came to the conclusion that infant baptism was false and decided to be rebaptized upon profession of their faith in Christ.[3] In his own confessions, as well as in other valid records, we learn that late in the year 1608 Smyth baptized himself by affusion and then some forty others. Thus was formed the first English Baptist church of history, the original of that group later known as General Baptists.

After a short time, however, Symth began to question the propriety of the rite in thus baptizing himself without apostolic succession, and with some thirty others began to make overtures to the Mennonites looking toward union with them. Upon such developments the remaining members, some eight or ten in number, under the leadership of Thomas Helwys, entered a protest, asserting that they had excluded the larger body from their fellowship for their sin "against the Holy Spirit" and declared themselves to be the "True Christian English Church at Amsterdam." Before union with the Mennonites could be consummated, Smyth died, September, 1612, but his followers continued in their endeavor and were finally received into that body January 21, 1615.[4]

The little group under Helwys, claiming to be the original English church, returned to England in 1611 or 1612 settling at London. Upon the death of Helwys, which occurred sometime before 1616, the leadership was assumed by John Murton who had been one of the prominent members in Holland. According to records, it would appear that Murton died about 1626[5] but that by this time there were five Baptist churches in England with a membership of at least one hundred and fifty.

The history of these congregations until approximately 1645 is rather obscure. It would seem that there were not suffi-

[3] Whitley is of the opinion that Smyth's position rejecting infant baptism was reached independent of Mennonite influence, in fact before arriving in Holland. He, therefore, never was an "Anabaptist." Whitley, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[4] Burrage, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 250.

[5] Burrage, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 272.

cient ministers for each one to have a pastor. For this reason, perhaps, beginning in 1626, negotiations were carried on for a number of years with the Mennonites of Holland seeking union with them. This was declined by the latter, however, largely because of a difference of opinion regarding the duties and rights of magistrates. Nevertheless, friendly intercourse was maintained between the two parties, and members from the English churches going to Holland were freely received into the Mennonite communions until the decade of the forties when all fellowship seems to have ceased. According to the Mennonite records, this was due to the fact that at this date the English began the practise of immersion, which intimated that "the Mennonites were regarded as unbaptized people." [6]

Meanwhile another branch of the Baptists had grown up in England to be known later as the Particular Baptists. In 1616 an Independent Puritan church was organized in London by Henry Jacob who had been minister of the congregation of English Merchant Adventurers in Middelburg, Holland, for a period of years, beginning in 1605. In 1622, or perhaps 1624, Jacob left London to become pastor in Virginia and his place was taken in 1624-1625 by John Lathrop who continued in office until 1634, when, after release from prison, he went to New England. He, in turn, was followed—about the summer of 1637—by Henry Jessey who remained their pastor for many years.[7]

Going back a short period in their history, we learn that on September 12, 1633, a certain number were dismissed from Lathrop's church and that in the same year eight more joined "to these"—"Mr. Eaton with some others receiving a further baptism." Of this church Rev. John Spilsbury became pastor, and in the spring of 1638 still another group, rejecting infant baptism, left the original body, now under the pastorate of Henry Jessey, and united with them.[8]

[6] Scheffer, *op. cit.*, p. 180, and Whitsitt, *op. cit.*, p. 61; Vedder, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
[7] Burrage, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 312ff.; Crosby, *op. cit.*, p. 307.
[8] Lofton, *Defense of the Jessey Records;* Whitsitt, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

But in 1640 a further step was taken. In that year Richard Blunt and some other members of the Spilsbury church, and evidently some also of the Jessey congregation, came to the conclusion that baptism by sprinkling or pouring was not Scriptural but that immersion of adult believers only was proper. The method of procedure, however, gave them concern. How should it be administered? And from whom should it be received in its purity, for "none having then so practised in England to professed believers," "because though some in this nation rejected the baptism of infants, yet they had not as they knew of revived the ancient custom of immersion"? But after many a "sober Conference" regarding it and "hearing that some in the Nether Lands had so practised" they sent over Mr. Richard Blunt, who understood Dutch, to confer with some of the Rynsburgers, among whom immersion had been introduced in 1620. Upon his return in 1641 with friendly letters from the Holland church and from

> John Batten, a teacher there . . . those persons that were persuaded baptism should be by dipping the Body . . . did set apart one to Baptize the rest, so it was solemnly performed by them. Mr. Blunt baptized Mr. Blacklock, that was a teacher amongst them, and Mr. Blunt being baptized, he and Mr. Blacklock Baptized the rest of their friends that were so minded, and many being added to them they increased much.[9]

This then was the earliest date for the practise of immersion by any Baptist church in England, and it was undoubtedly under the influence of the action of these Particular Baptists that the General Baptists adopted that form of the rite. By 1644, the number of churches attached to the former branch had grown to seven. In that year also these churches united to issue a Confession of Faith setting forth their beliefs, practises, and insistence upon the right of religious liberty. This is the first time that any English church in its confession prescribed immersion of believers as the true mode of baptism.

Here it may be emphasized that though these two branches

[9] Crosby, *op. cit.*, p. 101; Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 161; Burrage, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 299.

of the Baptist communion did not practise immersion until this later date, yet their history as Baptist churches is continuous from the earlier dates of 1608 and 1633. Their own records establish that fact. The early historians, such as Thomas Crosby,[10] so consider their origins. And finally these leaders themselves in their many statements constantly reject the term Anabaptist. A petition of 1614, written presumably by Thomas Helwys, is signed " By his maiesties faithfull subiectes most falsely called Anabaptistes." An epistle of 1615 and a supplication of 1620, are signed respectively " His Majesty's faithful Subjects; Commonly (but most falsely) called Anabaptists " and " . . . your majest'y loyal subjects. . . Unjustly called, Ana-baptists." [11] So likewise the Confession of Faith of 1644 and that of the General Baptists of 1660 set forth the faith of those churches " falsely called Anabaptist."

If then some Baptist churches existed for thirty-three years before they adopted immersion as the mode of baptism, what were their distinctive characteristics setting them apart from other Protestant—and even Separatist—churches? Perhaps the answer to that question is to be found in the following four principles:

1. The right of church covenant.
2. Salvation by personal faith in Jesus Christ.
3. Baptism of adult believers only. Rejection of infant baptism.
4. Freedom of conscience. Religious liberty.

1. The right of church covenant was the assertion that two or more believers could unite by covenant with one another and God to form a true church—a contention which they shared with a majority of the Separatist bodies. So John Smyth in 1607 wrote, "A visible communion of Saincts is of two, three, or moe Saincts joyned together by covenant with God and them-

[10] Vol. I, p. 111 and 147.
[11] Hanserd Knollys Society: Tracts of Liberty of Conscience.

selves . . ." [12] And in his book entitled *The Character of the Beast* printed in 1609, we read ". . . two men joyning together may make a Church. . . For as both those persons [though] unchurched, yet have power to assume the church each of them for himself with others in communing . . ." [13] And though Helwys and Murton evidently stressed baptism rather than a written covenant as the true form of a church, yet such a church was formed by people, with or without officers, thus *agreeing* together.[14] So likewise was the first immersionist church of 1641 organized, when according to the record " all these agreed to proceed alike togeather: and then Manifesting (not by any formal Words) a Covenant (wch word was Scrupled by some of them) but by mutual desires and agreement each testified . . ." (Whitsitt, p. 82.) That is, bishops and princes within the church order were denied, and people organized their own church simply upon profession of faith and mutual agreement.

2. Perhaps their primary position was their assertion that salvation was by personal faith alone—a principle which distinguished them at once from all other religious groups and threw them into opposition to them. John Smyth, in *The Character of the Beast,* 1609, says that to enter the church a person " must bee one that confesseth his Fayth & his sinnes, one that is regenerate & borne againe." [15] In his *Personal Faith* of 1610 we find, " That the church of Christ is a company of the faithful, baptized after confession of sin and of faith. . ." [16] In his statement of faith to the Mennonites while negotiating union with them (1610 or 1612) he says that the benefits of Christ's saving merits " we do graciously enjoy through a true, living, working faith " and that " Such faithful, righteous people . . . being the true congregations of God, or the church of

[12] Burrage, Vol. I, p. 233.
[13] Burrage, *The Church Covenant Idea,* p. 68.
[14] Burrage, p. 253; Burgess, p. 214, Art. 10.
[15] Burrage, Vol. I, p. 239.
[16] Burgess, p. 200.

Christ. . ." Finally, " That repentance and faith in the Messias are the conditions to be performed on our behalf, for the obtaining of the promises . . ." [17] and " That the outward church visible, consists of penitent persons only. . ." [18]

Helwys, in his *Declaration of Faith,* 1611, holds " That man is justified only by the righteousness of Christ apprehended by faith . . ." and " That the Church of Christ is a company of faithful people separated from the world by the word and Spirit of God. . ." And in the *Confession of Faith* by the Particular Baptists is the statement, " that salvation is onely and alone to be had through the believing in his Name." [19]

3. The logical corollary of this was the rejection of infant baptism, as heretofore practised by English churches, and the adoption of believers' baptism only. So, again, Smyth in 1609 declared that " baptisme in Popery is false baptisme, & so in the Lord's account no better then Pagan washing, being administered uppon infants a subject that God never appointed to baptisme . . ." and that the rite " is the external sign of the remission of sins, of dying and of being made alive, and therefore does not belong to infants." In the confessions of faith of Smyth and his followers (1610-1612), we find that the penitent alone are " commanded to be baptized and no unspeaking children " or " that the outward baptism of water is to be administered only upon such penitent and faithful persons . . . and not upon innocent infants, or wicked persons. . ." [20]

Helwys was even more explicit, asserting that " all infants as well as any dying before they have committed actual sin are redeemed by Christ," and " secondly . . . that men confessing their faith and sins are only to be Baptized and that infants not being capable of the word of God nor of faith and repentance are also uncapable of the Baptism of repentance." Later he declares " That baptism or washing with water is the outward

[17] McGothlin, W. J., *Baptist Confessions of Faith,* p. 76, No. 57.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 78, No. 64.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 180, No. XXI.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 62 and 79.

manifestation of dying unto sin and walking in newness of life. And therefore in no wise appertaineth to infants." [21]

A letter printed in 1623 and signed by "H. N." [22] reads in part, "The thing wherein I differ from the Church of England, is, they say at their washing or baptizing in their Infancy, They are members, children of God, and inheritours of the kingdome of heaven" but "There is neither command, example or just consequence for Infants Baptisme, but for the baptizing of Beleevers. . ."

Among the Particular Baptists we discover that as early as 1630 in Mr. Lathrop's church "some being greived against one that had his Child then Baptized in ye Common Assemblies" [23] were "desireing & urging a Renouncing of them. ." In 1633, as we have seen, "Mr. Eaton with some others" received "a further Baptism" [24] and in "1638, Mr. Tho; Wilson, Mr. Pen, & H. Pen, & 3 more being convinced that Baptism was not for Infants, but professed Beleivers joyned with Mr. Jo; Spilsbury. . ." [25] And in their confession of 1644 they are emphatic "That Baptisme is an Ordinance of the New Testament given by Christ, to be dispensed onely upon persons professing faith. . ." [26]

4. In their insistence upon freedom of conscience and the right of religious liberty these early Baptists were far in advance of other Separatists of that day. Barrowe could write,

it is the duty of the majestrates to suppress and root out by their authority all false ministries, voluntary religions and counterfeit worship of God, to enforce all their subjects, whether ecclesiastical or civil, to do their duties to God and men.

Even John Robinson held that

it proves not that the magistrate may not use his lawful power lawfully for the furtherance of Christ's kingdom and laws. It is true the magis-

[21] Burgess, p. 206 and 215. See also Crosby, p. 128.
[22] Burrage, Vol. II, p. 219.
[23] Burrage, Vol. II, p. 301.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 299.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 302.
[26] McGlothlin, p. 185.

trates have no power against the laws, doctrines and religion of Christ, but for the same, if their power be of God, they may use it lawfully and against the contrary.[27]

In opposition to this view Smyth declared,

that the magistrate is not by virtue of his office to meddle with religion or matters of conscience, to force and compel men to this or that form of religion or doctrine, but to leave Christian religion free to every man's conscience and to handle only civil transgressions, for Christ only is the King and lawgiver of the church and conscience.

This, written in 1612-1614, is, according to one historian, "the first known expression of absolute liberty in any confession of faith." [28]

It would seem that when Helwys and his followers returned to England about 1612 they presented a petition to the King and Parliament in which they beseech

the king to judge righteous judgment herein, whether there be so unjust a thing, and of so great cruell tyranny, under the sunne, as to force mens conscience in their religion to God . . . is it not most equall, that men should chuse their religion themselves, seeing they only must stand themselves before the judgment-seat of God to answere for themselves.[29]

In 1615, this same group, perhaps under the direction of John Murton, presented another statement to the King, entitled: *Persecution for Religion Judged and Condemned,* which in the form of a dialogue between "an Antichristian and a Christian" proved "By the Law of God and of the Land, And by King James his many testimonies, that no man ought to be persecuted for his Religion, so he Testifie his Allegiance by the Oath appointed by law." [30] In 1620, according to Crosby, followed a further *Supplication* in which they declared

That to persecute men for their conscience-sake, is contrary to the law of Christ, as well as to several declarations that had been made by the

[27] Scheffer, p. 182. Crosby, Appendix IV, p. 71.
[28] Scheffer, p. 183, note.
[29] Burgess, p. 294.
[30] Knollys, *Tracts on Liberty of Conscience,* p. 85.

king's majesty, and other famous princes; That both antient and modern writers, both Protestants and Papists, do condemn it as a great iniquity; and that to grant men liberty in matters of religion, can be no prejudice to any commonwealth, neither does it deprive princes of any power given them of God.[31]

Such is the brief story of the rise and principles of the English Baptists. But it is interesting to note how remarkably similar is the story of their beginnings in America. The first church was founded by Roger Williams, and of it he was the first preacher. But all evidence from historical records favors the conclusion that Williams never was immersed.

The facts are too familiar to be recounted in detail here. Roger Williams arrived in Massachusetts Bay, February 5, 1630. After some years of controversy with the authorities of the colony, chiefly in regard to complete separation from the Church of England, and the power of the magistrates in religious matters, he was compelled to leave the Bay and settled in Providence about June, 1636. The date of the founding of the church is generally given as some time in 1638. This is on the authority of an item occurring in the Journal of John Winthrop, Governor of Massachusetts Bay, under date of March 16, 1639:[32]

At Providence things grew still worse; for a sister of Mrs. Hutchinson, the wife of one Scott, being infected with Anabaptistry, and going last year to live at Providence, Mr. Williams was taken (or rather emboldened) by her to make open profession thereof and accordingly was rebaptized by one Holyman, a poor man late of Salem. Then Mr. Williams rebaptized him and some ten more. They also denied the baptizing of infants, and would have no magistrates.

This is considered by some to be the record of the first practise of immersion and the organization of the first Baptist church in America. But from this statement alone it is impossible to determine whether their baptism was merely a

[31] Crosby, p. 132.
[32] Winthrop, John, *Journal*, 1630-1649, Vol. I, p. 297.

rebaptism by sprinkling upon their rejection of infant baptism or whether it was immersion. There are, however, three strong arguments in favor of the former:

1. None of the English Baptists at this date, as we have seen, had yet practised immersion. Williams was acquainted with the writings of John Smyth, and his friend Brewster, of Plymouth, had been an associate of the latter in England and Holland. But though Williams gives many evidences of following Smyth he does not in any way advance beyond him, as to the mode of baptism, at this time.[33]

2. Winthrop never refers to their practise as other than anabaptism. Under date of January, 1642, he writes:[34] "Those of Providence, being all anabaptists, were divided in judgment; some were only against baptizing of infants [he does not say *sprinkling*]; others denied all magistracy and churches." Yet, when in 1640 Mr. Charles Chauncey, of Plymouth, later President of Harvard, "discovered," according to Winthrop,[35] "his judgment about baptism, that the children ought to be dipped and not sprinkled," it threw the whole colony into a furore. Magistrates, elders, and people "withstood the receiving of that practise" fearing "the annihilating our baptism, etc." If the Providence church had adopted immersion and also that of adult believers only, as the proper form, would not the colony have been the more greatly stirred? The new mode, even though for infants, was much more revolutionary and a greater denial of the efficacy of sprinkling, as a Christian rite, than was the rebaptizing of the adult by the customary method.

3. But the strongest argument against Williams' immersion are two references made by himself to that practise. On December 10, 1649, he wrote to Governor Winthrop in a letter that makes this contention clear and puts it beyond dispute, as follows:[36]

[33] Burgess, p. 350.
[34] Winthrop, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 53.
[35] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 332.
[36] *Narragansett Club Publications*, Vol. VI, p. 188.

At Seekonk a great many have lately concurred with Mr. John Clarke and our Providence men about the point of a new Baptism, and the manner by dipping; and Mr. John Clarke hath been there lately (and Mr. Lucar) and hath dipped them. I believe their practice comes nearer the first practice of our great Founder Christ Jesus, then other practices of religion do, and yet I have not satisfaction neither in the authority by which it is done, nor in the manner.

Three points in the above bear important notice. First, if Williams had established an immersionist church at Providence in 1638 and at that time had himself been immersed, would he in 1649, eleven years later, have written in these terms: "a *new* Baptism, and the manner by *dipping*"—"*their* practice"? The entire reference is to a form "*lately*" adopted. Moreover, he says, "I have not satisfaction neither in the authority by which it is done, nor in the *manner*." We know that Williams remained with the Baptists some four months only, and then came to question his second baptism, not being able to derive the authority of it from the apostles." [37] But now that "dipping" has been instituted he questions not only the authority but the "manner" likewise.

Secondly, John Clarke arrived at Boston from England in November, 1637, at the height of the Anne Hutchinson controversy. He immediately left with her group for some point north of Boston where they spent the winter, but went south in the spring of 1638 and settled, through negotiations with Williams, on Aquidneck Island, now Rhode Island. According to Winthrop, they had by 1640 organized a new church which refused to recognize any relationship with the Boston church.[38] But although by 1641 "Divers of them [had] turned professed anabaptists" [39] yet Winthrop never suggests that their method was that of "dipping" or immersion.

The third point, which is very significant, is the mention of Mr. Lucar. This Mr. Lucar was one of the charter members

[37] Winthrop, Vol. I, p. 309, and Chapin, H. M., *Doc. Hist. of Rhode Island*, p. 95.
[38] Winthrop, Vol. I, p. 330.
[39] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 39.

of the first immersionist church of London organized in 1641 by Richard Blunt and Samuel Blacklock, formerly mentioned. It is thought that Mr. Lucar may have come to America in 1644 or earlier, and in all probability was responsible for introducing the practise of immersion in this country. This we do know, from the manuscript of Samuel Hubbard, who became a member of Clarke's church in Newport in 1648, that the church was organized as immersionist in 1644 and that Mark Lucar was a member when Hubbard united.[40] This, undoubtedly, was the first immersionist church organized in America.

The second reference of Williams to immersion is found in a letter written to John Winthrop, Jr., Feb. 24, 1650 (the elder Winthrop died 1649):

> In my last [letter], I forgot a passage about that letter to the Commissioners which you were pleased to take from me. Mr. Browne lately told me that he cannot call to mind that ever it was produced; . . . I crave one line about it. Mr. Browne hath often professed liberty of conscience but now the way of new baptism spreads at Seekonk as well as at Providence and the Island [i. e. Clarke's settlement]. I have been so bold as to tell him that he persecutes his son and the people, and on the other side Mr. Newman also.[41]

There are several important items in this letter bearing on our question. First is the statement that "the way of new baptism spreads . . . at Providence." Would this be written in 1650 had they immersed in 1638? But who was Mr. Browne? Without doubt the Chad Browne who was one of the first settlers of Providence in 1638, a member of that church and a successor of Mr. Williams as pastor of it. He was living and was very prominent in Providence affairs in 1650. Moreover Chad Browne[42] had been chairman of a committee of four Providence men who had written a letter to the Massachusetts Commissioners some years before on certain boundary disputes. His son John had married a daughter of

[40] Whitsitt, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
[41] *Narragansett Club Publications*, Vol. VI, p. 192.
[42] Chapin, p. 187.

the famous Obadiah Holmes, immersed member of Clarke's church, who was whipped by order of Governor Endicott in Boston in 1651 because of his beliefs and teachings. Mr. Newman was pastor of the Separatist church (not anabaptist) at Rehoboth (Seekonk) and had excommunicated Holmes and others in 1649.

The significance of the above, then, is this: Mr. Browne, an associate of Mr. Williams, and a member of the Providence church since 1638, had often professed his belief in "liberty of conscience," but now (1650) that the practise of immersion (new baptism) had spread throughout the colony, he had opposed it. So much so had he, that Mr. Williams had "been so bold as to tell him that he persecutes his son [now an immersionist] and the other people, [immersionists] and on the other side [because of his Pedobaptist views] Mr. Newman also." Evidently, then, Browne, a successor of Williams in the pastorate at Providence, was opposed to immersion in 1650. It is interesting to note that "in 1649 Chad Browne was surveyor for the town of Providence." Why had he withdrawn from the pastorate of the church, and had he withdrawn from its membership as well?

Though all evidence points to the conclusion that Roger Williams never was immersed and did not form an immersionist church in Providence in 1638, nevertheless he was a Baptist, and established the first Baptist church in America, according to the original, fundamental tenets of that body. He insisted that the right of covenant was sufficient to form church-membership; that believers' baptism only was Scriptural; that magistrates had no right whatsoever to interfere in matters of religion, and that there must be complete liberty of conscience—convictions which form the fundamentals of Baptist doctrine. Even from the first days of the settlement in 1636, Williams—if he had not thus early actually formed a church—at least had held religious services in his own house, the basic affirmation of which was liberty of conscience.

It was from this practice there arose the famous Verin [43] case.

For whereas [writes Winthrop] at their first coming thither [Providence], Mr. Williams and the rest did make an order, that no man should be molested for his conscience, now men's wives, and children, and servants, claimed liberty hereby to go to all religious meetings, though never so often, or though private, upon the week days; and because one Verin refused to let his wife go to Mr. Williams so oft as she was called for, they required to have him censured.

And, in May, 1637, "It was agreed that Joshua Verin upon breach of a covenant for restraining of the liberties of conscience, shall be withheld from the libertie of voting till he shall declare the contrarie."[44]

For the enjoyment of this privilege Williams had left Massachusetts Bay. He called his new home Providence, because he "desired it might be for a shelter for persons distressed for Conscience. . ." Moreover, when he admitted others "into the fellowship of his purchase" at Providence, they "agreed that the place should be for such as were destitute (especially for Conscience Sake)." [45] And in 1654 he could rejoice that the "grand cause of Truth and Freedom of Conscience, hath been upheld to this day." [46]

Upon Endicott's punishment of Clarke and Holmes in Boston Williams wrote the Governor a letter of protest and condemnation: [47]

'tis impossible [he declares] for any man or men to maintain their Christ by their sword, and to worship a true Christ! to fight against all Consciences opposite to theirs, and not to fight against God in some of them, and to hunt after the precious life of the true Lord Jesus Christ.

And to Major Mason, during the dispute concerning the boundary between Rhode Island and Connecticut, Williams wrote in 1670:

[43] Winthrop, Vol. I, p. 286.
[44] *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island*, Vol. I, p. 16.
[45] *Records of Rhode Island*, p. 22, and Chapin, pp. 32, 33.
[46] *Narragansett Club Publications*, p. 264, Vol. VI.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

I have offered . . . to discuss . . . these three positions, first, that forced worship stinks in God's nostrils. 2d. That it denies Christ Jesus yet to come, and makes the church yet national, figurative and ceremonial. 3d. That in these flames about religion . . . there is no other prudent, Christian way of preserving peace in the world, but by permission of differing consciences." [48]

Finally, in cooperation with Dr. John Clarke, he was instrumental in securing for the colony the Royal Charter of 1663 for Rhode Island, granting absolute religious freedom for the first time to any American settlement. It

is our royal will and pleasure [it read], that no person within the said colony, at any time hereafter shall be anywise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinion in matters of religion . . . ; but that all and every person and persons may . . . freely and fully have and enjoy his and their own judgments and consciences, in matters of religious concernments. . .[49]

It was his firm and unyielding grasp of these great spiritual verities, and not immersion, that made Roger Williams a Baptist and founder of the first Baptist Church in America. No man in his day—or in any day—saw more clearly into the heart of religion than did he, and it was because of that insight that he felt impelled to grant unto all men freedom of choice as to rites and outward forms.

## II

We come now to the inquiry: What estimate did the first immersionists place upon the rite?

We have found that among the early leaders there was considerable concern as to securing true apostolic succession. Some questioned whether their *self-baptism* were valid. This, indeed, was the criticism made of their practise by all Pedobaptists of their day—Brownists as well as Papists and Anglicans. The proper administration of the rite, they said, must

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 347.
[49] Bicknell, T. W., *Story of John Clarke*, p. 192.

be by one who himself had been baptized within the true church —this the Baptists had not adhered to.[50]

Though most Baptists insisted that only baptized believers could be members of the church, they as strongly affirmed that any disciple—though himself hitherto unbaptized—could perform valid baptism. For, to them, the essential thing was faith —a new life begotten "by the immortal seed of God's word." Baptism was always secondary to that. "Whether is greater," asks one, "the water and washing, or the word that sanctifies the water?" So this new, "spiritual Israelite" had a right and duty—according to the great commission—to baptize those of faith who might desire it.[51]

From the first, therefore, baptism did not have the same efficacy for Baptists as it did for others. Thus, John Spilsbury, pastor of one of the seven Particular Baptist churches issuing the *Confession of Faith* in 1644, denied that their baptism was invalid, and drew his arguments from the fact that John the Baptist evidently had not been baptized by another. "Where there is a beginning," he wrote, "some one must be first. Further," he says, "I fear men put more than is of right due to it [baptism], that so prefer it above the church, and all other ordinances besides." [52]

One of the great leaders was Henry Denne, immersed in 1643, organizer and pastor of many Baptist churches about London.[53] Yet, so liberal was he in his attitude toward all other sects that he rose in defense of the Quakers who were being universally persecuted. He also wrote a pamphlet pleading "for a perfect toleration of papists in respect of their religious belief." "And why," he asks, "should their conscience be tortured for holding opinions which cannot at all affect their relations with the state—as transubstantiation, purgatory, merits, etc.?" [54]

[50] Crosby, *op. cit.*, p. 106, and Knollys, *Tracts*, p. 159f.
[51] Knollys, *Tracts*, p. 166.
[52] Crosby, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 302.
[54] Knollys, *Records*, p. xx.

Perhaps the most prominent among these early Baptists was Henry Jessey, eminent both as scholar and preacher. It was out of his church that many of the immersionists came in 1641, yet he himself did not adopt the mode until 1645. And though his members never practised immersion exclusively, he still "continued for twenty-five years to minister to them," during which time "baptism never became a term of communion" [55] in their midst. "He had always some of the Pædobaptist persuasion" in his church, says Crosby, "and blamed those that made their particular opinion about baptism the boundary of church communion." He "was also the principal person that set up, and preserved for some time a meeting at London of some eminent men of each denomination, in order to maintain peace and union among those Christians that differed not fundamentally; and this catholic spirit procured him the love and esteem of the good men of all parties." [56]

He was also the author of a treatise on open fellowship in which his thesis is that baptism is "the outward sign of the inward grace wrought by the spirit." "Therefore consider," he says, "whether such a practice, hath a command or an example, that persons must be joined into church fellowship by water baptism." John did not baptize any into the church; nor Philip the eunuch; nor the apostle "the jailor and his house." "And all the rest they baptized, were they not left free to join themselves for their convenience and edification?" [57] So among Baptists people are first baptized and then by covenant enter the church.

Again, he asks, who is there who "must not confess the change of times doth not necessitate some variation, if not alteration, either in the matter or manner of things according to primitive practice; yet owned for true churches, and received as visible saints." If "we have no gospel example for receiving without baptism," he continues, neither have we for

[55] Hanserd Knollys Society, *Records of the Churches*, p. 348.
[56] Crosby, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
[57] Bunyan, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 645.

" rejecting any for want of it." Therefore, we should be careful in closing the door of the church against the unimmersed lest we " keep him out of his Father's house." Remember, he admonishes, the Lord accounts " love the fulfilling of the law."

Another conspicuous Baptist leader of these years was John Gifford, who established the Baptist church at Bedford in 1650, with which John Bunyan united in 1653. Writing to this church at the close of his pastorate Gifford says:

> Now, concerning your admission of members, I shall leave you to the Lord for counsel . . . only thus much I think expedient to stir up your remembrance in; that after you are satisfied in the work of grace in the party you are to join with, the said party do solemnly declare (before some of the church at least) That Union with Christ is the foundation of all saints' communion; and not any ordinances of Christ, or any judgment or opinion about externals; and the said party ought to declare . . . that through grace they will walk in love with the church, though there should happen any difference in judgment about other things. Concerning separation from the church about baptism, laying on of hands, anointing with oil, psalms or any externals, I charge every one of you respectively, as you will give an account for it to our Lord Jesus Christ . . . that none of you be found guilty of this great evil; which, while some have committed, and that through a zeal for God, yet not according to knowledge, they have erred from the law of the love of Christ, and have made a rent from the true church, which is one.[58]

Finally we come to the position of John Bunyan, immortal tinker of Bedford jail, who was immersed in " a creek by the river Ouse " in the year 1653.[59] After his release from prison in 1672, Bunyan wrote three articles under the general heading: *The Terms of Communion and Fellowship of Christians.* The individual titles of these three are:

1. His confession of faith, and reason of his practice.
2. Differences about water baptism no bar to communion.
3. Peaceable principles and true.[60]

[58] Bunyan, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. xxvii.
[59] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. xxvi.
[60] Vol. II, p. 591.

Bunyan's position was that true baptism is of the spirit of which water is the sign only; and, following Jessey, he declared that water baptism is not an initiatory rite into the church. "Water baptism hath nothing to do in a church, as a church; it neither bringeth us into the church, nor is any part of our worship when we come there." [61] It "makes no man a visible saint, nor giveth any right to church fellowship . . . faith and a life becoming the law of the ten commandments, should be the chief and the most solid argument with true churches to receive saints to fellowship." [62] In fact, it is the Spirit that baptizeth us into one body—the church.

And those who practise sprinkling may have had this inner experience, this baptism of the Spirit, which brings all believers into the church—even the visible church. For by that experience they are members of Christ's church, regardless of any form of baptism. "Their conscience may be better than either yours or mine," [63] he reminds his fellow Baptists. "Because they have not been baptized have they not Jesus Christ? Or must we now be afraid to say that Christ is better than water baptism?" "Must we go to hell and be damned, for want of water baptism?" he exclaims.[64]

Bunyan makes a clear distinction between what he terms the doctrine and the command or practise of baptism. The doctrine of baptism is that truth or mystery that the believer is dead in Christ unto sin and has been buried and raised again unto life. The practise of baptism is the immersion in water which symbolizes this marvelous truth. He accuses the exclusive immersionists among the Baptists of emphasizing the latter to the neglect of the former, which alone is essential. "A man may preach the command," he says, "yet none of the doctrine which baptism preacheth." [65]

[61] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 623.
[62] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 622.
[63] *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 625.
[64] John Bunyan, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 627.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 625.

Finally, he protests that he does not indulge in their sins those who sprinkle—he but bears with their infirmities, "it being indeed in our eyes such; but in theirs, they say, a duty till God shall otherwise persuade them." [66] It is therefore a matter of conscience with them, and to deny them fellowship is tantamount to denying them their liberty. For, "there is no difference between that believer that is, and he that is not yet baptized with water; but only his going down into the water, there to perform an outward ceremony, the substance of which he hath already; which yet he is not commanded to do with respect to membership with the church." [67]

Therefore, he asserts with noble passion, "I plead for communion with men, godly and faithful, I plead that *they* may be received, that God hath shewed us *he* hath received, and commanded *we* should receive them." [68] "I count it so far off from being any act of friendship, to press baptism in our notion on those that cannot bear it; that it is a great abuse of the peace of my brother, the law of love, the law of Christ, or the society of the faithful. Love suffereth long, and is kind, is not easily provoked; let us therefore follow after the things that make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify another." "My reason is," he affirms, "because we are exhorted in all things to put on love; the love of church communion; contrariwise you oppose, Above all things put on water. For the best saint under heaven that hath not that, with him you refuse communion." [69]

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 631.
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 627.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 639.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 631.

# CHURCH AND STATE

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In my garden there is a rose-bush. This bush has not given the beautiful and fragrant roses which I desire. Some of the branches are very vigorous and apparently should produce the finest flowers, but those which do appear are small and inferior. The other branches, while far less vigorous, produce roses which while possessing beauty and fragrance are few in number and relatively weak.

Having talked with a man who understands the culture of roses, he has explained the cause of the difficulty and my disappointment. The nurseryman who supplied this rose-bush was in too much haste to take the necessary time for growing a bush of the best type. The unsatisfactory rose-bush is grafted instead of being a growth upon its own root. The root itself is vigorous, too vigorous in fact for the graft which was inserted in the root. As a result the vigorous root throws out its own branches from below the graft, and these absorb most of the strength of the root which strength develops into the inferior rose blossoms of a primitive period in rose life. The graft portion of the bush is thus left without proper nourishment, and both the branches themselves and the roses, though delicate in petals and fragrance, are too weak to arrive at the proper perfection.

The rose specialist says that the only way in which to grow roses which are satisfactory is by giving close attention to this bush and keeping the branches which start from the native root trimmed away immediately as they emerge, and that even then the best results are not obtainable. He adds that only a specialist in roses ordinarily should attempt to use those bushes which have been grafted, and that rose-bushes carefully grown from the seed or from cuttings, each of which develops

its own root, are preferable for rose culture, even though more time and more patience are required.

The story of the rose-bush is a parable of Church and State, an abridged history of two of the elemental strivings of human nature, an epitome of the growth of the human soul in religion and in civic life. Lest the parable may not be entirely clear in itself I will indicate briefly its meaning.

Human nature has always contained the elements and the possibilities of all the aspects which life reveals. Among these native elements, what we call civic life and what we call religious life have been two of these aspects most certain and most sustained. At the same time, all through the early generations of man both civic matters and religious experience were relatively primitive and relatively slow in growth.

It is even more obvious, as we look back to those early periods, that no distinction was made between the two. Any such distinction as that between religion and state was not only foreign to the thinking of the early days of man but certainly would have been quite unintelligible. Any one who is at all acquainted with the history of humanity will be quite aware of the accuracy of such a statement as soon as it is offered.

The history of any one of the peoples of the past will amply illustrate the statement. An example may be found in its fulness by observing the growth of the Israelitish people. Though the Israelites were but a minor nation as compared with great state organizations, yet for a considerable time they illustrated sufficiently a development of civic life into national essentials. Their preeminence, however, was in the field of religion, so that they became an outstanding example of what is called a theocracy. All this growth, however, was essentially a unity, particularly vital in the religious elements, weak in national forms.

An outstanding example in the opposite direction is observable in the Roman people, where religion was relatively

inferior and subordinate, and the civic aspects unfolded in an almost uniquely remarkable fashion, so that Roman law and organization are to a considerable extent the basis of national life up to the present time. In Rome, however, just as in Israel, there was never any separation between the civic growth of the people and its religious expression. Though inferior in religion, Rome was a unity so far as government and religion were concerned, just as the Israelitish people remained in these respects an essential unity.

In the later generations of the Roman empire, the early days of the development of Christianity, these two forms of the unity of human nature came into conflict, Rome emphasizing the governmental elements of human nature, Christianity with its noble inheritance from Judaism, stressing no less the greatness of the religious experience. The reality of this conflict and its historical significance could not of course be seen in those days, for the obvious reason that no period understands itself and the significance of its growth as these may be understood by later generations, who look back and take into account not only the period itself but the elements and the forces which generated it. The essentials of a great conflict, however, were latent as these two dominating and essential qualities of human life were brought into contact from two varying inheritances and with two underlying impulses.

For the time being the legal elements of the situation were largely in control. Law was not only at the basis of the so-called Middle Ages but was largely in the ascendant so far as the expression of the life of the people in general was concerned.

The religious inheritance of Europe, however, could not be permanently suppressed. Even if, in itself, it might have been held in abeyance continuously, subject to the forms of legality, such condition ceased to be possible as soon as the Renaissance, the real birth of interest in facts, the beginning of modern science, appeared. Whether it be through accident in the history of things as they are, or whether it be merely

natural, always eventually facts have become the hand-maiden of religion. Legalism eventually falls, not only because of its own weight but because formulæ cannot permanently face what history has to show.

Thus the Reformation was born, and a new period in human experience began; essential unity of human life was brought to face a new problem and required to test itself in a new way. It was a new event for the preeminent element of religion as this displays itself in the manifold make-up of the human soul. Religion came to the forefront of human endeavors as it had never done in the past, at a single period, for a large proportion of the human family. Still imperfect, it was nevertheless the better and the more promising factor of human life as a whole.

At the same time, for the major portion of the people, it seemed to be only a segment of life, and it made a strong appeal to a minor part of the world. If it seemed to do more than that, it really did so only in appearance. Roman law, and legalism as its outgrowth and the underlying structure of medieval Christianity, were too potent to be easily overcome.

The substance of the outcome is well understood. The religion of the Reformation and of the succeeding days was itself primarily legal even though it was nominally the overshadowing feature of the peoples of Europe. Christianity as the religion of the Western world became enmeshed anew in the forms of civic life, as these had developed up to that time. Real religion once more was enthralled. The strength of the native constitution of man, instead of growing symmetrically into a life achieving and emphasizing civic possibilities and religious possibilities in due relation and due proportion, had unwittingly suppressed real religion and the better strivings of the human heart.

Of course such a situation could not continue indefinitely. The religious quality of human life must find proper expansion. That which was really best and most significant in the

soul of humanity would find an avenue of escape from its temporary imprisonment.

The many sects of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the inevitable outcome of a legal restraint which, though natural up to that time, had wholly overstepped its permanent possibilities. Moreover, it was relatively ruthless in its efforts to maintain the status quo.

Every one acquainted with history knows what occurred. Thoroughly religious people began to repudiate the civic form, the State of the period, so far as religion was concerned, and to attempt to free themselves from the intolerable religious burden which the State in its civic aspirations had imposed. Thus the Separatists were produced in England and similar, though less well-known movements, occurred elsewhere. It was the time when the new world of America was appearing, whose apparent freedom and opportunity seemed to offer a haven of peace for deeply religious souls as they looked for better things.

Under such conditions, prompted by the thought of the natural freedom in America, it was not strange that men like Roger Williams should announce a new solution of the age-old problem and that such a man should find the goal of religion in separation of Church and State. America, therefore, both because of its place in the history of the world and because it offered a new solution of the great problem of human life, became and has remained the area of the latest endeavor in this surpassing conflict.

The story of what has occurred is too recent to need recital, and its essential characteristics are too well known to have been overlooked by those who have been concerned to observe religious and moral developments in the United States. For three centuries an assumed separation between Church and State has been tried as a means of achieving civic life in its best forms along with religious life of a high type.

Few probably would attempt to maintain that the results

have been satisfactory. While religion and the church in their various manifestations still represent the best there is in human experience as a whole, many are disposed to urge that religion is far from potent and that the church is far from what it ought to be. This is impressively the thought of those who are beginning to see that the underlying and permanent qualities of religion are those that express themselves in good conduct as the natural fruit of moral qualities in the people.

The acuteness of the condition is observable in the palliatives which are being applied. The earliest of these is the Sunday school. For more than a century it has been employed to meet the evident need. It has so clearly failed that recourse to something else was obviously required. In recent days a variety of supplementary devices have been tried. Each in itself, and all together, these give some help. As a solution of the problem, however, they are manifestly inadequate because they do not reach the heart of the difficulty and cannot take into account the essential factors of life itself. In fact, the better they appear to succeed the more they estrange the purest element of life from its fellows and increase the task of restoring the inherent unity of human growth.

Religion is made to assume the place of a branch grafted into the root of human nature as a means of hastening religious culture, strength, and beauty; and the civic life, with its lower standards and more primitive possibilities, is shaping religious growth and moral development.

Historically, separation between Church and State may very well have been inevitable and even the best means available at the period. It would be quite unwise for any one at the present time to declare against what was done by the Separatists, by the Non-conformists in general, and by Roger Williams and his successors in particular. One may think now that he can see ways which for them would have been better, steps which, on their part, would have been wiser and would have led to better results. The obvious fact that no one in those

days did achieve anything more useful is, in itself, significant, and may well prompt not only to reserve on our part but to some measure of poise as we try to estimate the difficulties of those days and the avenues which were selected as the pathway, even though more or less unconscious on their part, which should lead to a better time.

For us today, then, the opportunity is neither to complain of the past nor to allow ourselves to be unaware of the present facts and of the possibilities, incipient now but essential, if the future is to reach its proper goal.

The crux of the situation is fairly obvious. Separation of Church and State proceeds on the assumption that such a separation is actually practicable. The prime question accordingly is for one to inquire for the worth of this assumption when it is compared with the essential unity of human nature, a unity which cannot be discounted.

At once when this is done in view of all the facts which offer themselves it is reasonably clear that this assumed separation has always been essentially a fiction. Each person, as a part of the state in which he lives, is one person, whether he goes to the booth to vote or whether he attends a service in church. In considering his choice for political officials he is distinctly the same person who offers himself in a place of worship or meditates upon religious questions. Any one who will look into his own experiences is very well aware not only that such are the facts but also that the religious worshiper is very likely to be something of a politician even in the midst of his worship. It does not so often occur that the citizen in pursuit of his political responsibilities is keenly religious and moral. That is because the native root of human growth is so largely dominant and the attempt at grafting religion to it has been so unsuccessful. What is needed is to recognize the unity of human life, including its religious elements, and, at the same time, to furnish these religious qualities suitable means for normal attainment.

Fortunately we already have a suggestion of the route to be taken. The suggestion is found in the public-school system. So far as it has been given its best standing, it is recognized as a part of the civic life of the people. At the same time, where it has been accorded anything like its proper place, the school has been allowed to function freely, utilize the best material which is available for education, and achieve worth-while results at the same moment that it is a part of the state. In a similar way religion may have a place within the state, recognized by the state as a part of itself, supported by the state and also enjoying the freedom which is essential for religious life and growth. Thus the present pseudo-separation of Church and State would be eliminated and a wholesome tone would be introduced into the civic life.

One recognizes of course that for the time being this is quite impossible in the United States, and that many will look upon it as a step backward rather than a movement in advance. Such a step would indeed recognize the essential unity of human nature, which, during earlier generations was merely assumed. Instead of retracing the steps of humanity, however, there would now be, through a distinct and intelligent recognition of the unity of life, a marked advance and an escape from the loss which has accrued by attempting a separation which can never be actually accomplished and which in its fruits has deprived the civic elements of human nature and the state as a whole of the very qualities without which the state itself must eventually fail.

In view of the general outline which I have given it will be natural to ask a somewhat specific statement as to some of the detailed developments which may be expected. This fortunately is not difficult to supply. One can readily see that, when religion is duly recognized as an essential element of human nature required for good conduct, the state itself will provide sufficient places for worship, a suitable compensation for the conduct of religious service in these places, appropriate training

for those of the citizens who show special aptness for religious leadership, and, at the same time, will leave the people entirely free to choose forms of worship and religious ideas which seem to them most useful for the highest type of human service. Along such a path of development may be found religious freedom for all the people in a state organization which thereby utilizes all the latent possibilities of human nature for the highest type of manhood and womanhood.

Religious education, so far as this is separated from public worship, will be an element naturally of the general educational system, specialists in that subject, as in history, biology, music, etc., being chosen in view of their fitness for that high service.

It is not only taken for granted, of course, that some time must elapse before any such better condition is realized but also that any attainment in that direction comes through a continuous process of education in the broad sense of the term and the proper liberalizing of human thought in a world which is definitely rich in such possibilities.

In the meanwhile some practical steps may be taken. Forward looking leaders, recognizing the path to be pursued, may do much through education and suggestion. They will find many minds, especially the young, eager to respond. Already community churches are opening the door in the direction we are to take. Religious teaching, as supplementary to the usual studies in some communities, is a helpful promise. At no distant date some communities, by common consent, may include religion as a part of the recognized course of study, with approved teachers. Full development will come eventually.

# WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

Professor Edgar S. Brightman, of the Graduate School of Boston University, the Department of Philosophy, is one of the most vigorous and able advocates in this country of "Personalism," a philosophical theory which was first given significance by Professor Borden P. Bowne, of Boston University. We count it a grace to be able to present his paper.

Gerald Birney Smith, Professor of Christian Theology in the University of Chicago since 1913, is also Editor of the *Journal of Religion*. He needs no introduction to our readers, and his article will be easily seen to be of primary importance, characterized by expert, scholarly thought.

The Reverend Charles H. Watson, D. D., for long years a distinguished pastor of New England churches, is Librarian of The New England Baptist Library. From this vantage of books and wide association with men he sees some things not observed in the hurry and "busy-ness" of the pastor's life.

Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, Dr. I. G. Matthews, is dynamically interested in the pastor's study and use of these Scriptures. He reviews the attitude of the Baptists to the Old Testament in a serious study of their Confessions of Faith. If the study does not quite reveal inspiring results, it is certainly very interesting.

The facile and ready mind and pen of Professor R. E. E. Harkness is given to showing in this number that Baptist churches existed and functioned at least thirty years before immersion was practised or advocated. The array of authori-

ties he can cite for his thesis is impressive, and one can draw his own conclusions on the subject of Open Membership.

Our Crozer Librarian, Frank Grant Lewis, offers a worth-while proposition, fresh, novel, and engaging with reference to a theoretic if not practical union of Church and State. Holding that each of these, Church and State, represents a right functioning of man's social spiritual nature, he believes their entire separation is good for neither.

The Reverend Frank Durham, whose article appeared in the July number of the Quarterly, has been pastor of the Immanuel Baptist Church, Los Angeles, for over eleven years. He did his college work at Ottawa University, and was graduated from Hamilton Theological Seminary. He has had pastorates also in Kansas.

# NOTES AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS

TOWARD an understanding of the present disintegration of older theological views, certain facts may be worth considering. It has not been by the decisions of councils, the reasonings of the theologians, the researches of historic critics, the teachings of modernists, or the hesitations of the agnostics. These simply record or express results already arrived at in human experience.

The disintegrating comes of and is one with life's processes and human experience. Religion like life is a principle of change, of change that means growth. Call it evolution, or call it what one will, there is, everywhere in the physical world, a throwing off of old forms and functionings, and a creative activity initiating the new. This is neither a dead nor a finished universe. It is in the making endlessly; and no conceivable goal can mean an end of its onward changing. If purpose or end be conceived, it must be an ever "increasing purpose." Its source, in mind and power, is not a static but a dynamic; in itself increasing, developing; an infinite of creative energy, capable of boundless self-creation, creating itself, never finished, always becoming. Reason demands such a conception; the facts of the universe, in their vast and endless oncoming variety, give ground to the conception.

Now religion, not only *like* life, but *of* life, an element of life, is also thus creating, increasing itself, perpetuating itself, a divine-human energy. In this activity older forms, even older functionings are sloughed off, that new, or at least other forms may emerge and function. Now religion is a flame of devotion; now a fervor of evangelism; here a reticence of men's souls and a seeking of the vocal silences of the universe; there an ethical passion even to martyrdom; then a social tidal wave that inundates industry and the policies of nations; at

other times a holy apocalyptic hope or a rapture of worship. Always seeking to enwrap the soul and transform life, always seeking to express itself in movement, never still. Never the same in manifestation it is nevertheless the one, the continuing One, the Life of God in the soul and the soul's response in will and deed.

This is one of the meanings of these times of change, when nothing seems to have stability or to encourage the older forms of the faith; when our most loved creeds are being challenged and shattered and our ideas of God and religion are being broken.

Is there no rest, no ground for certainty and repose? Is there nothing settled, finished, unchangeable and infallible? There is! The only true rest, that certainty is the unchangeableness of change. In the spiritual world, as in all the realms of the universe, change, the motion of growth is the one sure dependable fact. The infallible things are not the things that are made; nor the creeds and formulas that men have written and spoken; nor yet the experiences men have passed through. The one infallible, unchanging thing is Change, God Himself, His character and what we may call His purpose. The one infallible Thing is God, ever being more fully revealed in greater fulness in the changes of our apprehension of Him in Jesus Christ.

"There is one law, one element and one far off divine event to which the whole creation [Creator also] moves." It *moves!* and it is the moving which disturbs those who want a static God or religion and faith. "Through the ages one increasing purpose runs." It *runs, increases;* but it increases in the way of the Will.

*This is the pure exegesis of the vast unchanging change that is ever going on.* This is the one stability and the one rest. And the one clear duty in this changing life is the quest of the soul for goodness and its growth up into the fulness of God. *Growth* is the secret of all the darkness and mystery

of this ongoing world. They are the growing pains of the soul as it is led to spiritual manhood.

"EXPRESSIONISM," a poorly named, but influential practical principle of modern life, is also one of the explanations of the present-day unrest and pessimism in religion. Not only the World War, but the pressure of a mechanistic civilization, and the limitations of the years preceding, which arose in the institutionalizing and standardizing of all the otherwise free activities of man's soul, have had, and still have, their part in the self-assertions of a regnant sort in all fields of thought and life.

The world was weary of conforming to standards set up by others and particularly by the previous orders of society. They found these standards hindering the spontaneous expression of what was dynamic and real within themselves. And this was true in philosophy, in theology, in education, in art, music, literature and architecture.

The result has been an orgy of self-assertion. "Expressionism" has become the dominant practical philosophy of vast multitudes. It has not avoided the realms of religion, ethics, and theology. Many in these multitudes feel that *the conventional religion,* especially its theology and ethics, *does not reach or reveal reality.* Stilted patterns of conduct; perpetuated metaphysics of the older schools in theology; an artificiality in religion, where type-experiences dominate the soul, instead of inspiring it to free worship and genuine love; a theology or theologies, which, instead of being an intellectual expression of a vital religion, are constantly restraining the soul and requiring its activities and functions to conform to a forecast model. Many therefore break with the conventional ethics, resent religious appeals and reject the theological doctrines. They engage in all sorts of spiritual vagaries and often without the sense that their religion or their irreligion any better reaches or reveals reality; but with the sense that at least it is

no worse a representation of it. In the meanwhile they are conscious of a certain integrity of mind and soul since they do not make believe to believe what they do not believe.

There are others, perhaps more serious-minded, who attempt or are tempted to extravagant forms of life and effort, in moral and religious way, in hope that by these they may help break through the wrack and ruin to the Reality Himself. They do not pretend that they have found the final forms, they resent forms that are imposed on the souls; nor do they flatter themselves that their representations are even replicas of Reality in religion. They simply hold that what men so present in their conventional religion is *not* a true picture of what is or ought to be. They hope also that their particular types of response to the World-Reality may be a medium through which that reality may be seen in its verity and nature. They express *themselves*. They insist that moral and religious leaders shall hear them, shall see things as they see them, that the whole may come in view of all and by the exaggeration of these self-assertions may have the blindfold of the conventional stricken from their eyes.

Above all, these "expressionists" in religion insist that the reality in religion and morals is not to be found in the externals, but that reality is other, more, higher, deeper than these; so much "more" and often "other" that any sincere soul can as well come at God and perhaps more truly find Him, if the soul rejects these externals and is free to express itself in its own ways.

Still others of these multitudes believe and feel that religion has value only as it springs from and expresses the inner motive and will of love; only as it is a self-expression of the soul's idea of God and what God would that men should offer Him. Custom-religion does not do that for them. It rather induces a kind of unreality in their worship and conduct, and makes therefore a hypocrisy of it. Many of them find it difficult, if not impossible, to enter into any joint religion-service except as

free to follow their own individual convictions. Holding that religion is a holy tryst with God, a matter between the soul and Him, two is company and three is a crowd. Nor are they ignoring the social aspects of religion, or its social implications. It is simply that, for them, religion must concern itself with reality in themselves and in God; and the present forms do neither.

Another phase of the disintegration of older views is also allied to a general world movement, and is not to be attributed to a demoralized scholarship, or decay of religion, nor even to German theologians and philosophers. It is not so deep or finally significant as these. It is a wave of superficiality, or rather of distraction consequent upon the sweep of democratic principles and the resultant contempt for the right of individuals in authority to order life and its ways. It is readily seen in the Russian movement in government, in the Chinese revolution, in Mexican rejection of Church domination in the affairs of State. India and Egypt are feeling the pulse of it, and even Scotland gets restless in its place in the British Empire. Old orderly government is being resented, and new ways of another sort are being demanded. This spirit, for such it is, is a revolt of the moral judgment of mankind, but still, in superficial ways, venting itself. It might be styled the "Jazz" revolt. It does not reject the essential in what is, nor is it in any degree creative of the new. It is determined, however, to treat all that is or that concerns life and its activities, in a new way. It takes the elements of human life and functioning and reconceives them, expressly to find a new form and value.

Government is not utterly repudiated, but given a new order and form; aye! and even another function often. Art is not despised but made to appeal to another than the æsthetic sense, perhaps to reason, as the vehicle of metaphysics. Music is not cast out or rejected but recast in tintinnabulating ways

that minister to the less sophisticated æsthetically. Architecture is treated primarily from the practical rather than the æsthetic point of view, or claim is made that the most beautiful is identical with the practical.

Nor does religion escape the thrust of this spirit; and even ethics is being " jazzed." To justify this use of a term we note that Sigmund Spaeth affirms, in the August, 1928, *Forum,* writing as he does, concerning music in particular, that " Jazz " is not music, or a form of music, but a treatment applied to music. Indeed he notes that it is a treatment applied to all the arts and to life in general. " Jazz " is " a distortion of the conventional, a revolt against tradition, a deliberate twisting of established formulas." He reminds us also that the word is primarily a verb and may so be used.

In this sense every revolutionist or reformer has " jazzed " his predecessors and the accepted norms in the field in which he is at work. In music every radio fan has heard the " jazzed " productions of even the great composers, who themselves did the same with the still earlier composers and their forms.

We are witnessing in this time what might be called the *" jazzing of religion, ethics, and theology."* This would not be an unfair way of designating some of the movements and activities in the religion-world today. Certainly Mr. Spaeth's terms are aptly descriptive of what has been and is taking place.

In some measure, at least, it means a throwing off of the shackles of the past, and may, for many, mean no more than that—a resentment of authority, a thrust at all authority, an assertion of independence, a mild anarchy. For others it may mean a more significant affirmation arising in the sense of the possession of creative ability or profounder vision, and, though a revolt, is to be welcomed.

Sometimes such treatment operates to clear out the tyranny of earlier modes in ethics and religion, as in the Protestant Reformation; or the writings of a Bushnell; or as, (we speak reverently) when Jesus " jazzed " the Mosaic law, not rejecting

its essential but brought out its richer content, and said, "Ye have heard how it has been said"—"but *I* say unto you." Thus the treatment makes room for new constructive ideas and ideals. Few reforms or stages of progress in any field have ever been accomplished or made effective until the way has been cleared of convention and men have been turned from the hard, beaten path of the past.

The history of religion and morals alike furnish apt instances of this. Theologies have led or followed these distortions and revolts. A long period of a commonly accepted faith, which became institutionalized and gave issue to barren forms is inevitably broken by a so-called reformer who, for his day, "jazzed" that faith. Not all who reject the faith of a day or an era, add any constructive element in the new doctrine offered, or can offer an acceptable substitute for the old; but, in some measure, they make way for the new faith.

In view of the new practical anarchy in religion and morals, the good-minded and the religion-minded will be tempted to try and enforce the old order with creedal enactments and even by appeal to legislation by the legislative bodies of States and nation. We say, "tempted," because we believe that such a movement is a sure sign, and even a confession of the failure of a theory, a doctrine, or a reform, in all ethical and spiritual concerns. That is to say—failure so far as all the essentials and vital elements of success are concerned—namely, their rationality, their social value, and their spiritual appeal.

Goodness and religion should so present themselves, or be presented, as to win the approval and will of man. Compulsory goodness or religion enforced lose their value and all their intrinsic worth. Nothing is moral or has righteousness-value for the individual whose acts take the aspect of conformity to an ideal, unless the actions spring from the moral will of the person. To secure the form of the good, against or

without the will of men, is to deceive ourselves as to the real end sought.

When therefore appeal is made to law-making bodies for the enforcement of any cause, moral or religious; when it asks such aid as the policeman and the law court can give, that cause is already *lost*. And the same is true of a faith or a religion, when men seek to embody it in a creed or symbol and imply or announce a penal sanction for refusing consent, whether that sanction be political, social, or ecclesiastical.

What then are the good-minded to do, one asks. They, who wish to be leaders in the right, how shall they be true to their convictions of the true and right? How can we ever achieve a kingdom of goodness among men?

This writer is "the driest of the drys"; he believes in the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution and its vigorous enforcement; but he does not think it is making people temperate or good by this means. The amendment is primarily a social device for social protection, especially for preserving the natural rights of children and women, and the freeing of the weak, and the emancipation of the enslaved.

If temperance in use of narcotic stimulants is sought, the law which is enforced by police power, is not the way to achieve it in men. Here, as for all the virtues, temperance requires the initiative of the will in response to an appeal to the moral sense. No virtue, either in man or child, can be achieved unless the ground of appeal is seen to be reasonable and to have social value of some sort. Nor does it avail to appeal to some "ideal of absolute right," even though there be such; nor yet to call the virtue a command of the Lord. Obedience may indeed be the issue of such an appeal, but unless the will and reason attest the "virtue" as true, the obedience is not of the essential personality and so is not *his* goodness and does not represent *him*. Fear, custom, the impulse of imitation may operate to produce certain conformities to conventions, especially if certain clear penalties threaten failure to conform; but this is not goodness.

Several things may be suggested by way of what the good-minded may do to effect goodness in their fellows: First, the exposure and utter rejection of all artificial distinctions in the realms of moral and spiritual value. This is the first step toward discovery of real essential goodness which has its own efficient power to lure men to its practise. No enemy of real goodness is so provocative of resistance by men as the insistence upon little and insignificant distinctions, which the ethical martinets with their meticulous criticisms attempt to impose as divine requirements on their fellows.

Second: They may endeavor to find in history and contemporary experience what values in belief and conduct have proved to be of lasting power of appeal, and have commended themselves to men's moral judgment. The emphasis on these permanent evaluations, the common elements of religion belief and of goodness will command an allegiance which no merely legal injunctions can secure; and as springing from the mature judgment of the race will attain the ends of a true religion and morals and express the realities of men's souls.

Third: They may seek to learn from the life and teachings of Jesus the *essential* of all righteous acts and the soul of religion in faith and worship and conduct. Clearly Jesus, as judged by the records, is not a teacher of precepts, but the embodiment of a spirit and the expression of a principle. In the free application of this principle, *Love,* men may find the way to righteousness and peace. The simplicity of his faith and life ought to make clear that he was no legalist.

It has been said a thousand times by theologians and Christian orators, and will be said again by them, that the deepest inspirations for the conceiving and energy for producing the masterpieces in art, architecture, literature, and music are found in religion and its expression in feeling, ideas, and convictions.

Of course such statement will be challenged, disputed, and

supposedly disproved by radical opponents of religion. One wonders therefore that now the *Atlantic Monthly* for September, 1928, should consider an elaboration of this thesis such an important and justifiable one as to give it place, when presented by Robert Lynd, essayist for the *New Statesman* and book reviewer for the *London Daily News,* under the title "Why Literature Declines."

Unwilling to go so far as Blake to deny progress in the arts, he claims that literature is "just as likely to take a downward direction as an upward." Nevertheless he seeks an explanation of the retrogression in literature and concludes, giving his own belief, "that literature begins to go to the dogs as soon as Earth becomes restive and declares its independence of heaven." However crude the ideas of heaven, or mistaken they might be, the life of mortals was lit up for them by the presence of the immortals, and the gods presided over human destinies. So "to me it seems impossible to believe that it is mere accident that all the supremely great epics, from Homer's to Milton's, were written by poets who not only accepted the heavenly background, but wove it into the themes of their narratives." And he holds that literature would suffer an impoverishment as a result of the death of the gods equal to that of an extinction of the stars to the physical universe.

But literature is not unique among the arts in this close association with religion. "Architecture, sculpture, painting, and music, in at least as great a measure, seem to flower most abundantly when they are in the precincts of the temple or the church." And for the not unsympathetic reader he makes his claim good. No Homer until a great poet who believes in Olympus, nor Milton till one comes who believes in the war between Heaven and Hell. Maybe it can be argued that these beliefs are superstitions, and man is wiser and happier without them; but literature will be poorer. "The future of literature is in the past. It is in the recovery and resurrection of the vanished faith of vanished ages."

This is true not only in poetry but in prose. The fault with most religious writing, in poetry or prose, lies in the fact that the writers fail to write in terms of their own experience. The writings are argumentative, not imaginative, more or less propaganda. The human background is lacking: it is theology not religion. He raises the question therefore as to how much literature owes to the acceptance of a larger world than the world we touch with our hands, and see with our eyes. Even the great poets and priests when in conflict, and priests turn prophets who write unorthodox views, " they carry on their quarrel against a background that contains other worlds than our own."

Shakespeare's plays could never have been written except out of an imagination steeped in Christian conceptions, for even that profound sense of sin in his tragedies is essentially a Christian sense. Gœthe's *Faust* and Ibsen's *Brand* and *Peer Gynt* without the supposition of a supernatural background—be it only for dramatic purposes—would not be possible, or at least none have ever thus done as greatly.

His conclusion is strong and clearly stated: " The more we consider the matter, the more we are compelled to the conclusion that literature, while often in revolt against orthodoxy, is inextricably bound up with the religious imagination." Few theologians could write without severe criticism and perhaps accusation of superstition and terms of obloquy, these words of Mr. Lynd: " Everywhere the imaginative man, confronted with the mystery of life and death, is forced to adopt a religious attitude to life—the attitude of awe before the eternal mysteries. Without it there can be neither the greatest poetry nor the greatest prose, neither the verse of Milton, nor the prose of the Bible. . ."

In the July *Atlantic,* an anonymous author writes on " The Sensible Man's Religion," and aptly quotes a saying attributed to the Earl of Shaftesbury, that " Men of sense are really but

of one religion." When asked what religion that was, he replied, " Men of sense never tell."

The author proposes, however, to find out what the religion of some of his friends, " men of common sense," and indulged in a laudable endeavor to " dip into the minds " of some of them. Being a banker he proceeded with patience and caution. What he reports has little to do primarily with religion, and is really concerned with their theological beliefs. One would welcome what perhaps even these men of sense never tell, a revealing of their religion, their devotions, their spirit in worship, their habits of prayer, their whole souls' reaction to their idea of God and Christ. What is offered is scarcely this, and probably religion is not revealable—except in actions and cannot well be formulated in words.

All of which reemphasizes the incessantly overlooked distinction and difference between religion and theology. Religion is a life, centrally and essentially; and theology is but the intellectual expression of that life. Religion is first the life of God in the soul and reciprocally the life of the soul in God. The dynamic relation of religion to God is this activity of God's Spirit in man. That all men's responses are not similar is no doubt due to the varying ideas men have of God, and therefore what they may conceive that God expects of them. Their theology therefore is a significant, perhaps the most significant thing in a man's religion, as determining his reactions to the inspiring Spirit. But that is not all; for religion is those reactions, the life man lives, the worship he offers, the prayers he makes, his reactions to his fellow's lives in their mutual contacts. Otherwise the mere intellectual assent of a man to certain propositions of the creeds may leave him outside of religion and religion outside of him.

" The Creed of the Man of Sense " might more accurately define what the author found who mined the minds of newspaper writers, doctors, lawyers, professors, statesmen, and business men. As such, it is worthy of more than passing com-

ment; and many of our readers, who have come to their faith by philosophic paths, might find an astonishing similarity to their own views.

The author found variety in the approaches of these men, but little difficulty in formulating a common basis, the common denominator being rather clearly defined. This he defines in terms of The Apostles' Creed. This amended creed, which we venture to reproduce here for the sake of comment, is as follows:

I believe in God Almighty, Maker of the Universe, and in Jesus Christ, His Spiritual Son, worthy to be our Lord; possibly conceived of the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary (but these seem unimportant); suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried.

I believe in His descent into Hell and ascent into Heaven, symbolically. I believe there is some evidence that bodily He arose from the dead, and I believe in the immortality of His spirit; also allegorically that He sitteth on the right hand of God Almighty, and that I am judged or shall be judged by the spiritual views he taught on earth. I believe that no one could find a wiser, juster, more understanding, or more merciful judge of my actions.

I don't quite understand the Holy Ghost, though I believe in the Holy Spirit of God; I believe in the advisability of some church organization (though I do not like any of them very much). I do not appreciate the significance of the Communion of Saints. I believe in the forgiveness of sins, in the possibility of the resurrection of the body (though this seems remote), and in the probability of spiritual life everlasting (concerning the desirability of which many are in doubt).

"Practically all these men believed in a God," some even claiming an "intuitive" feeling of the existence of God, claiming that "intuition is a quick subconscious summary of accumulated knowledge and experience, and that a feeling of this sort, widely prevalent among sensible people, should be relied on." Believing that the existence of God cannot be proved (or His non-existence) by scientific methods, they weigh conclusions as well as reasons, and conclude God is. They think "the agnostic sets too high a premium on his own intellect—too high a value on his methods and rules of scientific investigation."

They believe then in God—what kind of a God? Here divergences are as numerous as the minds questioned. Generally they "do not attempt to describe their God," which, as we have suggested, is faulty since they cannot have a clear notion of how or whether to worship or pray or act toward Him. As to designating Him as "Father" they had few trinitarian implications, but conceived the title as implying a relation of God to man that might be helpful to many in suffering, and an aid to the strong in times of trial.

Concerning Jesus Christ there was no doubt in the minds of the author's friends as to the admiration in which He is held by all believers and most unbelievers. As over against all philosophers they would save the Gospels. They are convinced that He "could not have seen so deep down into the well of fundamental truths unless He had been inspired; and that there could be but one source of inspiration, the 'rigorously just and substantially kind and beneficent governance,' which they accept as God."

With these comments we suggest the reading of this author's article in full. Insufficient as this theology may be for the functioning of the rich spiritual Christian life, it is intimative of a deeper concern than is often attributed to these so-called men of sense, and of the certainty that, sought patiently, every soul of man will yield essential religion interest, and some sort of religion.

Furthermore the author does not propose criticism of the churches, but is interested to discover and interpret the point of view of a body of men who, at least seem to be very well worth while. "Men of such sincerity, tolerance, and open-mindedness would listen with patience and interest to the empirical reasoner and even to the sound mystic."

In the record of an experience and observations of the effects of psychoanalysis upon what the world calls "normal" woman, Edna Yost, in a recent *Forum,* has some challenging

facts and makes some challenging charges which should arrest attention and start further inquiry.

The article is of interest to our readers because many of them have been urged to engage some psychoanalyst to aid them in ministering to the spiritual and moral life of their parishioners. Indeed we have heard the value of such an aid lauded to the skies and the use of such an analyst strenuously advocated. Such an advocate has been requested to offer such a plea in these pages.

Meanwhile Edna Yost's experience and plea are searching and cautionary signals to " go slowly," though not inspired by any purpose to warn workers in the religion realm.

Religion, she thinks, in the usual sense of the word, is for many persons " a cast-off insufficiency," persons who, in many cases, are seeking freedom from some obsession of weakness or slavery, but who instead of finding freedom escape into a new set of shackles. Their underlying personal need urges them into the acceptance of some science, philosophy, some intellectual something, in which they can find self-expression and freedom.

For this possibly no science—or pseudo-science—offers such attractive possibilities. " The opportunity to reveal one's soul, to strip it naked before another, is a delightful temptation to the ego." And " It seems reasonable, too, that in this revelation lies much that would be good for us to know." But there is a price one pays for every experience. The author thinks that psychoanalysis gives a false sense of freedom and that " psychoparalysis " is the more fitting term. Personalities are being sapped by a paralyzing dry-rot, the dry-rot being the method of psychoanalysis. The introspective approach to life creeps subtly over one and clings—to some becomingly and well perhaps; but to most persons it is unnatural. Well-learned tags and labels take the place of assimilated thought, a process which eventually stops genuine thought and feeling. Whatever experience arises " a nice satisfying box of tags takes the

place of understanding," and is applied to one's fellows as well as oneself. " Inferiority complex " here and " sex repression " there, etc., and life is explained and understood. The virtue of sympathetic understanding is lost, and every person becomes a pathological study, while the analyst and his subject incline to think the analyst is the only one who really understands men.

The analyst is daring something more serious than others in the medical profession have attempted. Emotions, as well as mind, are diagnosed, " those tender, most delicate, and complicated strands that interweave to make the human being." It is the human soul, the whole man, the analyst tries to treat. He thrusts himself in, no! he asks entrance to the holy place of reserve, the deeps of private personality. He profanes what each person should hold sacred to God only; what no man or woman should ever open to any but the secret holy Spirit of God. And those who submit to this exposure of their intimate life to human gaze might recognize that even Jesus did not ask it of men as a condition either of understanding or healing them; nor did He use " the twosome method of the analyst." Surpassing perhaps all other teachers He surrounded Himself with twelve and with few exceptions gave Himself to the multitudes or to one only in the presence and contributing influence of the multitude. The relation between patient and analyst is necessarily exceedingly personal, made so by the technique of the analyst; and, with two persons of the opposite sex the emotional peril must be apparent.

We can credit the majority of the analysts, writes Miss Yost, with the high intentions of the medical profession as a whole; we can forget the knave who may assume this service, but we must also recognize that they must be blind to some of the results of their practise. In any deep, personal relationship the influence of one person upon another is recognized. In psychoanalysis this influence is intensified a thousandfold, because of the submissive, emotionally exposed attitude of the patient; and she reflects back to the world not herself alone,

but this superstructure of the analyst, overexposed and highly developed. "That is, *the soul of the subject is lost, trapped, escaped from one bondage, called a psychological state, into the snare of another personality, and of a life of attempting to be what he or she is not.*"

"Know thyself" was the wisdom of savants long before Freud, we are reminded, but something saved them from Freud's method. It is his method, not the idea, that is unique, and "the rot in phychoanalysis lies in its method." The technique of self-knowledge must start with what the soul is capable of rather than what analysis wants to do.

Miss Yost has rendered a good service in this article, to which we call attention. It should be read at length and in full, and, by ministers especially, deeply reflected upon.

# WHAT'S WHAT IN THE MAGAZINES

ALMOST every student of Christian beginnings would agree that the religion of Jesus and the religion about Jesus were from the first distinguishable. The former soon passed out of sight; the latter, meeting the needs of the Greek world, survived. The second phase of this movement in history has been called Paulinism, not because Paul was its creator or even author—although he has been assumed to be—but because he was its formulator or systematizer. Though all do not agree, yet at present those who maintain that Paul was influenced more or less profoundly by the mystery religions of the Roman world are in the ascendant. Nevertheless while careful search has demonstrated the close resemblance between Greek mysticism and Paulinism, it has failed to discover the origin of the pivotal point for Paul: how the external historic fact of the death and resurrection of Christ becomes an inner spiritual fact for the believer.

The distinguished Italian scholar, Vittorio Macchioro, believes [1] that the failure to find the key is due to an unscientific examination of mystery religions as such—a hybrid medley—instead of a careful study of the individual cults. If this had been done in the case of the ancient and wide-spread cult the nucleus of which was the myth of the murder and rebirth of Zagreus, son of Zeus and Persephone, the author is convinced that Orphism would have been seen to meet the three searching requirements Clemen demands of all who would postulate any connection between the mysteries and Christianity: (1) the complete inexplicability of the idea or institution under discussion on the basis of Judaism or Christianity; (2) a correspondence in things compared of internal character as well as external form; (3) clear evidence of the prior

[1] *Orphism and Paulinism*, Journal of Religion, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (July, 1928), pp. 337-370.

existence of the other religion to Christianity and in its environment. Orphism, its distinguished investigator maintains, meets all three of these requirements in a way that no other cult does, and had enormous importance for the shaping of early Christianity. Established for centuries, wide-spread in the Greek world, meeting in a peculiar way the deeper needs of spirit of disillusioned society, it seemed as the mediator between Jewish Christianity and the Greek world. The problem for the early missionaries in Greece and for those today in Africa or India has much in common. It has always been true that to be understood a message must be transformed to meet the needs and also the comprehension of those to whom one would minister. This point need well be pondered by those who feel incensed at the thought of the "degradation" the person of the Master suffered when reclothed in myth. Myth is as necessary for religious experience as is the picture or the poem for art. It acts as the medium whereby abiding values are made concrete and communicable. Had not the mystery of Christ taken on mythical form it could never have been given to the world. And the procedure is not to be felt as detracting from its sanctity.

Although the present article is an able discussion of the nature and spread of Orphism, we are waiting with expectancy the appearance of the more comprehensive study, *Zagreus,* of which an English rendering is now in preparation.

M. S. Enslin.

In the August issue of the *Atlantic Monthly* George Wharton Pepper has a reply article to one by the doughty Mr. MacManus which appeared in May. In the former article Mr. MacManus looks abroad, concludes we are in an awful mess, in fact have plumbed to the very "nadir of nothingness," and feels no particular surprise. How could it be otherwise with so many Protestants abroad in the land? Are there not but two positions possible, one good and one bad—central

authority and individual judgment, although he is so impolite as to call it sectarianism? Since Protestants choose the latter, of course they reach the Nadir of Nothingness. The only remedy is to go over to Rome, en masse. Sectarianism will never do this, and so, humanly speaking (whatever that means), there is no solutions.

And lo, ere three months elapse another David, this time the debonair former Pennsylvania senator, speaks encouraging words, "Let no man's heart fail because of him; thy servant will go and fight with this Philistine." And in a little more than seven pages, presto, we go from "Nadir to Zenith." David slang only one stone; Senator Pepper uses a good number: each argument that Mr. MacManus raised is weighed in the balance and found wanting. It is wrong to say that there are but two systems of religious thought: the authoritarian, or Catholic, and the sectarian which is Protestant. Rather the two should be stated as "pure individualism, which is neither Catholic nor Protestant, and the other is collectivism, which includes both Catholic and Protestant." Then comes the question: what sort of a group of collectivists can rightly expect to be illumined from on high? Mr. Pepper thinks "the voice of all the faithful is the voice of God," while he thinks that Mr. MacManus thinks that "the Voice Divine is heard, if not exclusively, at least normally, only when the pope makes an ex-cathedra utterance."

Then follow a few words on papal infallibility, which as Mr. Pepper points out was not discovered until July 18, 1870, and a partial list of the pope's duties. Personally, if this is only "an incomplete catalogue," my heart goes out in sympathy to the toiler in the Vatican. But these duties and powers are such that our David is able to sling a particular hard and sharp stone at his adversary: "If Protestantism is poor on the side of authority, Roman Catholicism is bankrupt in the matter of representation." This is, of course, not strictly new, but its repetition is sweet music to Protestants. Perhaps this char-

acterization of the author as a second sweet singer in Israel is not entirely without point.

Then comes the crux. How does all this work out in the United States? In a presidential year, and in particular, in *such* a presidential year, we could hardly fail to expect this question. Well, it works out badly, for, shades of Joe Miller's joke book, "What will happen if Uncle Sam bids the devout Roman Catholic arise and do battle, while the pope by divine direction lays upon him a different injunction?" It had seemed that this question was almost venerable enough to be laid at rest beside its sire, "What will happen if an irresistible force hits an immovable object?" But funerals of such able henchmen should be delayed until after November fourth.

And then the sweet breath of hope. Chaos, only chaos—can Mr. MacManus be right? No, a thousand times, no; if Protestantism would only forget mechanics and would lay its emphasis on faith, might we not expect the universal acceptance of the adage of St. Vincent of Lérins: *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus?* Perhaps we might, but not until a good many saints in Israel have laid their armor by and gone to rest at home. But Mr. Pepper is more optimistic. Isaiah was right, lion and lamb will lie down together, only, since this is the twentieth century, they are classified as Protestant, Catholic, and Roman Catholic; and in the words of the poet:

> One port, methought, alike they sought;
> One purpose hold where e're they fare;
> O bounding breeze, O rushing seas,
> At last, at last, unite them there!

And as we emerge from the nadir and attain to the zenith, we can exclaim with Dante, after a similar pilgrimage, "And issuing, once more beheld the stars."

M. S. Enslin.

# BOOK REVIEWS

**The Graphic Bible: From Genesis to Revelation in a Series of Animated Charts Accompanied by Explanatory Text.** LEWIS BROWNE. The Macmillan Company. $2.50.

*The Graphic Bible* is at least graphic. Maps and charts face us on the opening page and are with us to the end. Rarely is there a page on which we have not one or more suggestive symbols of ancient life. They occupy about one-half of the more than 150 pages of the volume and to the informed tell the whole story at a glance. They are vividly alive. Lions are there, and camels are on the trail. The Roman eagle crouches over the country, and the great dragon threatens to devour. The thistle and the rose interpret the sand dune, and the fertile valley to the eye, and the sea is alive with the monsters of the great deep.

It is vivid, but it is also judicious. There is not too much on the page. The central features stand out clearly, and the graphs illumine the important and the crucial moments in history. Even the very frequent milestones, found in the corner so often giving the passing dates to the wayfarer, are as and where and when they should be.

Accuracy may be added as one of its virtues. The author has been over all the country, and what he has seen he has sketched. The hills and the valleys are almost as suggestive as a good relief-map. It is possible to follow the pilgrimages of the Israelites, the escapades of David, or the battles of Saul in great detail and with more accuracy than some of the famed Palestinian tours.

The charts are animated and the text is explanatory. And the text does explain. The important facts are given, the great movements estimated, and the great leaders interpreted unusually well for the space used. It is a book that ought to be part of the equipment of every Sunday-school teacher in the country, and unless the pastor is well versed in his Bible, this will be found one of the handiest and most helpful books that deal with the movements in the large.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

**Studies in Early Christianity.** Edited by SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE and presented to Frank Chamberlin Porter and Benjamin Wisner Bacon by Friends and Fellow-Teachers in America and Europe. New York and London: The Century Company. 1928. Pp. ix, 467. Price, $4.50.

ONE of the pleasantest customs among scholars is the presentation of a volume of essays written by friends in honor of some significant event

of their fellow student. On the continent these *Festschrifts* are often presented on such occasions as the sixtieth or seventieth birthday of a distinguished scholar. It is a most gracious act. This present volume of studies has been prepared by nineteen distinguished scholars at home and abroad as an expression of appreciation and regard for the two men who for over three decades have been engaged in extending our horizons of knowledge, Frank Chamberlin Porter and Benjamin Wisner Bacon.

Although the separate essays were written independently of one another and with no thought for making an orderly book, there is a surprising lack of repetition. And what is more important, each essay is a real contribution. The preface rightly remarks that the topics chosen represent frontier issues; in fact they might perhaps be classed as weather vanes, showing the direction in which the wind is blowing. Though each is critical and thorough-going, they are not so cumbered with technical detail as to be unintelligible to any save specialists.

An interesting survey of the tasks before the student of the text of the New Testament; two papers on that singularly illusive figure, the Baptist; four studies on Jesus; two on Messianism; two on Paul; one on II Clement—this gives a hint of the diversity and interest in this volume of studies. The list of authors contributing would read much like *Who's Who* in New Testament.

The Century Company is to be congratulated for a splendid piece of work.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

**Jesus and the Pharisees—A Study in Christian Tradition.** DONALD W. RIDDLE, Assistant Professor of New Testament Literature, The University of Chicago. The University of Chicago Press. 1928. Pp. vii, 193. Price, $2.00.

TO MOST readers of the New Testament Pharisee is synonymous with hypocrite and all else that is evil. No word is felt to be more true than the one Jesus is supposed to have used to them, "Ye are of your father the devil." Nor is the Christian reader to blame for this view. Such is the representation in the Gospels. Their pictures of them are inconsistent, incomplete, and incorrect. Corrections of these misrepresentations have been attempted by scholars—Jewish and Christian alike—as, for example, Herford, Montefiore, Abrahams, and Moore. Professor Riddle attempts to show how this misrepresentation arose, after first examining the Gospels in order of date to see what they actually say.

It is only as we see Christianity as essentially a gentile cult coming into contact and conflict with Jews, rather than as a Jewish movement becoming gentile in character after repeated futile efforts to win the Jews,

that the phenomenon becomes intelligible. Actually the piety of the Pharisees and the Jewishness of Jesus are friendly rather than antipathetic. As Christianity developed, as the group of Jesus' followers extended its influence into non-Jewish communities and developed non-Jewish customs, un-Jewish attitudes grew into anti-Jewish positions. All this is reflected in the Christian writings. Our Gospel accounts are to be seen as colored, if not produced, by the situations confronting the writers. Accordingly there is little correspondence with fact in the Gospel portraits of the Pharisee or in the apparent relation existing between them and Jesus. As Christianity found itself in open break with Judaism and in need of weapons against it, it was but natural to find them in accounts of similar clashes in the life of the Lord. "The traditions of Jesus and the Pharisees, when taken as produced by the necessities of the Christian communities, become at once understandable in themselves and useful in the delineation of the life of the early Christians."

So by *Formgeschichte,* which seeks to account for the rise of the Gospels by discovering the interests which produced them, Professor Riddle helps us to apply corrections to obvious misrepresentations. His treatment on the whole is salutary in spite of a slight overdose of "methodology" and "milieu."

M. S. Enslin.

**The Rise of the Missionary Spirit in America, 1790-1815.** Oliver Wendell Elsbree, Ph. D. Williamsport, Pa.: The Williamsport Printing and Binding Co. 1928. Pp. 187.

The author treats a section of the Protestant religious ferment in the United States during the early years of the republic. Although he has succeeded in making the book readable it is scarcely comprehensive enough to be understood by those ignorant of the field. The 25-page bibliography might have brought forth a book so complete as to have been a contribution to the study of historical religion. There is evidence of too much "boiling down."

Modern religious writings tend to fall into one of two classes: popular or scholarly. These seven chapters have elements of both classes. But Doctor Elsbree seems to admit a limitation not implied in the title when he uses Chapter VI—which in this work is called "Prophecy, Prayer, and Propaganda"—with only a few minor changes, in the July issue of the *New England Quarterly* under the caption "The Rise of the Missionary Spirit in New England, 1790-1815." Titles may confuse rather than clarify.

Commendatory of the production is its concise portrayal of a phase

of early American missionary endeavor, first, among the Indians; then, in regions beyond. Any sane and unprejudiced treatment of missions today is grasped at with eagerness by a varied host of interested readers. Their majority judgment will probably be that the Bucknell history professor has facilely and discriminatingly presented some valuable data, that he has not failed in his " purpose of determining what might be done in the way of a social study of American religious ideas as they were being slowly but effectively changed by missionary appeals during the quarter century before 1815. . ."

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

**Cosmology: A Text for Colleges.** J. A. McWILLIAMS, S. J. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1928. Pp. 243. $2.50.

THE author of this book has had the severe technical training required of all candidates for the priesthood in the Roman Catholic Church. At graduation he became instructor in logic and ethics in his own college. Later he was appointed professor of philosophy at Campion College, Wisconsin. Subsequently he was appointed professor of criteriology and general metaphysics in St. Louis University. At present he is professor of Cosmology in the same University. It is an excellent text-book for its purpose. The author develops his argument of each chapter according to the canons of logic dominant in Aristotelian circles. There is the formal thesis; argument, the major, the minor. Difficulties are briefly stated; replies to each objection. Unquestionably students secure excellent intellectual discipline under the guidance of Father McWilliams.

The contents of the book may be given in the author's words:

> Cosmology may be defined as a study of the general characteristics and basic principles of the material universe. Cosmology differs from the physical sciences not in its material object (which, being the material universe, is the same for both) but in its formal object. By this last is meant that while the particular sciences set certain limits to their inquiry, philosophy recognizes no limits either as to the extent or the profundity of its investigations. Thus cosmology brings within its purview all material substance, whether ponderable or imponderable, living or non-living. In the present treatise corporeal life as such is omitted as being capable of more successful discussion in psychology, but living bodies are in every other respect within the scope of cosmology. The four causes (efficient, final, formal, and material) are investigated with the purpose of carrying the inquiry as far as may be possible to unaided human reason. While in the pursuit of this object the most reliable data of recent science are laid under contribution, cosmology, as a special branch of philosophy, must not degenerate into a purely scientific treatise; nor, on the contrary, must it merge into general metaphysics, or ontology.

Father McWilliams is living and teaching in the modern world of science and philosophy. He necessarily brings under critical examination

such questions as teleology, evolution, monism, time, space, the significance of physical law, and the ultimate constitution of matter. He does not leave his pupils in doubt as to what he believes to be the correct conclusions. For the most part they are in harmony with the accepted beliefs of Christians, whatever their group-names.

It is significant that Father McWilliams has the "Nihil Obstat" of Arthur J. Scanlan, S. T. D., *Censor Librorum,* and the "Imprimatur" of Patrick Cardinal Hayes, Archbishop, New York. These signatures are simply formal. They have no bearing on the scientific and philosophical value of the book. The author appeals to scientific authorities and to logic for his data and conclusions.

MILTON G. EVANS.

**Philosophy.** BERTRAND RUSSELL. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1927. $3.00.

THIS volume is published in Great Britain under the title *An Outline of Philosophy.* The author's ability as a mathematical physicist has thrown a sort of halo about his head. His name is one to be conjured with by those who are attracted by originality in investigation, virility of thought, and lucidity of diction. When such an one ventures outside his own domain and makes incursions into the fields of religion and ethics he carries with him the weight of his reputation acquired in his own realm. For this reason many read with eagerness his *Why I Am Not a Christian,* and it has been thought worthy of a reply found in a book entitled, *Why Mr. Bertrand Russell Is Not a Christian.* But whether he is a Christian or not, he is one of the most influential serious writers of the present generation. A leading American thinker calls him "one of the most distinguished and brilliant philosophic minds of the age." When such an one gives his matured reflection on life's most perplexing problems it is worth more than three dollars, the cost of the book. It is well to find out how he handles his materials and whether he knows the problems.

This volume is Bertrand Russell's *Philosophy.* It is his attempt to construct a reasoned view of the universe in the light of present-day physics and psychology. The world is explained today in terms of protons and electrons in "matter" and relativity in "æther." Accordingly, Mr. Bertrand Russell begins a new era in the history of philosophy. The science of the nineteenth century has made necessary a philosophy peculiar to the twentieth century. This volume is Mr. Russell's philosophy. As in all his writings he is provocatively stimulating. In very simple language he makes exceedingly clear the structure of the atom and Einstein's theory of relativity. With almost the wizardry of a magician he abolishes

the one cosmic time and the one persistent space and substitutes space-time in place of both. The author is impartial. He pays his respects equally to Physics and Psychology. He is a philosopher who knows the scientific method of induction, and cannot refrain from saying: "Induction raises perhaps the most difficult problem in the whole theory of knowledge. Every scientific law is established by its means, and yet it is difficult to see why we shall believe it to be a valid logical process." He is a philosopher who knows the field of psychology. He has interesting things to say to the Behaviourist, from whom he has learned something. To the battle-cry of the Behaviourist "Death to images" he calmly writes a chapter on "Images" and another on "Imagination and Memory."

The table of contents will indicate the method and scope of the volume, and will probably call forth a desire to read it:

CHAPTER

I. Philosophic Doubts.

PART I

MAN FROM WITHOUT

II. Man and Environment.
III. The Process of Learning in Animals and Infants.
IV. Language.
V. Perception Objectively Regarded.
VI. Memory Objectively Regarded.
VII. Inference as a Habit.
VIII. Knowledge Behaviouristically Considered.

PART II

THE PHYSICAL WORLD

IX. The Structure of the Atom.
X. Relativity.
XI. Causal Laws in Physics.
XII. Physics and Perception.
XIII. Physical and Perceptual Space.
XIV. Perception and Physical Causal Laws.
XV. The Nature of Our Knowledge of Physics.

PART III

MAN FROM WITHIN

XVI. Self-observation.
XVII. Images.
XVIII. Imagination and Memory.
XIX. The Introspective Analysis of Perception.
XX. Consciousness?
XXI. Emotion, Desire, and Will.
XXII. Ethics.

PART IV

THE UNIVERSE

XXIII. Some Great Philosophies of the Past.
XXIV. Truth and Falsehood.
XXV. The Validity of Inference.
XXVI. Events, Matter and Mind.
XXVII. Man's Place in the Universe.

It is well to know quite thoroughly the mind of one who closes a work on philosophy with these words:

> Philosophy cannot itself determine the ends of life, but it can free us from the tyranny of prejudice and from distortions due to a narrow view. Love, beauty, knowledge, and joy of life; these things retain their luster however wide our purview. And if philosophy can help us to feel the value of these things, it will have played its part in man's collective work of bringing light into a world of darkness.

MILTON G. EVANS.

**Possible Worlds.** J. B. S. HALDANE. New York and London: Harper & Brothers. 1928. Pp. 305. $2.50.

THIS volume consists of thirty-five chapters of varied lengths. During the intervals of research work and teaching, the author has occasion to make frequent railway journeys. To a large extent they were written while riding in railway coaches. They reflect the informality of conversation between passengers interested in at least thirty-five subjects varying from Enzymes and Vitamins to Science and Politics and Eugenics and Social Reform, and Man's Destiny. The conversation must be instructive and entertaining when "the most famous speculative scientist in England and probably in the world" is one of the party. He is Reader in Biochemistry in the University of Cambridge and Head of Genetical Department, John Innes Horticultural Institution.

Most of the chapters have appeared as contributed articles in the English publications, *Rationalist Annual, The Nation, Daily Mail, World Today, Manchester Guardian, Graphic, Modern Science,* and in the United States in *New Republic, Forum, Harper's Magazine, Century Magazine,* and *Atlantic Monthly.* The writer states his purpose in writing so informally:

> Many scientific workers believe that they should confine their publications to learned journals. I think, however, that the public has a right to know what is going on inside the laboratories, for some of which it pays. And it seems to me vitally important that the scientific point of view should be applied, so far as possible, to politics and religion. In such spheres the scientific man cannot, of course, speak with the same authority as when he is describing the results of research; and

in so far as he is scientific he must try to suppress such of his own views as have no more scientific background than those of the man in the street.

The title of the volume is taken from the title of the chapter, "Possible Worlds." This chapter is almost as whimsical as Kingsley's *The Water Babies*. It alone justifies the epithet speculative applied to the distinguished scientist. But "speculative" is not a term or reproach. The author himself describes the character of the chapters. He is not writing merely to while away the tedium of railway travel. He has in mind the present disturbed condition of humanity.

The papers in the first part of this book deal mainly with matter of fact. Those which follow are more speculative. In scientific work the imagination must work in harness. But there is no reason why it should not play with the fruits of such work, and it is perhaps only by so doing that one can realize the possibilities which research work is opening up. In the past these results have always taken the public and the politicians completely by surprise. The present disturbed condition of humanity is largely the result of this unpreparedness. If the experience is not to be repeated on a still greater scale it is urgent that the average man should attempt to realize what is happening today in the laboratories.

But the author confesses that his *Possible World* is a dream world. He is dreaming as Hegel dreamed, or as Hæckel, or any other philosopher; but Haldane knows he is dreaming. He has his merry jest at philosophers.

Generally, philosophers who construct a funny world come to believe that it is the real world. They find few to agree with them, and it is unfortunate that the whole life of a philosopher should be devoted to a single intellectual experiment. Even a rabbit can often be used for several, provided it is not irreversibly damaged. But philosophers damage their minds by coming to believe in their own hypotheses. This is a more or less irreversible process like ankylosing in one position a joint which should be flexible. I propose therefore to see what light, if any, can be thrown on some of our assumptions by considering whether a plausible world or a coherent experience might not exist in which they are not fulfilled.

Those who have read the many endeavors to understand the universe will sympathize with the distinguished "speculative scientist" when he felt moved to write:

Now, my own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we *can* suppose. I have read and heard many attempts at a systematic account of it, from materialism and theosophy to the Christian system or that of Kant, and I have always felt that they were much too simple. I suspect that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of, or can be dreamed of, in any philosophy.

If any reader of this notice wishes to relieve the monotony of routine work by traveling with a companion who will give valid information and

fruitful suggestions of practical value in politics and sociology and religion and at the same time entertain by wit and humor and droll observations, let him secure a copy of *Possible Worlds*.

MILTON G. EVANS.

**The Pathfinder in Church Work with Young People.** EDWIN PHELPS. The Judson Press, Philadelphia. 1928. Pp. 220.

THE general secretary of the Baptist Young People's Union of America has an enthusiastic confidence in this generation of youth. Into this guide to church young people he has stored a wealth of practical material bearing on purposeful program in "worship, work, and giving." Mr. Phelps chooses his analogies from big business, science, and government, to illustrate the principles of success in Christian endeavor. The book represents his faith and policy growing out of five years of executive leadership of an important youth organization.

STEWART G. COLE.

**The Evolution of New Testament Christology.** CHARLES B. WILLIAMS, Ph. D., D. D. Boston: Richard G. Badger. Pp. 215. $2.00 postpaid.

PROFESSOR WILLIAMS is a teacher of many years of experience. He is at present Professor of New Testament Interpretation in Union University, Jackson, Tenn. He has the teacher's skill in adapting instruction to the degree of maturity of his pupils. He is aware that his materials are the priceless memorials of Jesus, and that the One who inspired the sources requires humility, singleness of purpose, and scholarship enough to testify truthfully concerning their origin and purpose. Professor Williams has endeavored by methods of approved historical inquiry to discover the "psychology" of the earliest witnesses. This is a most difficult procedure. It is not easy to escape the "psychologist's fallacy"; that is, to read into the mind of the author what is really in one's own. But the author safeguards himself in this in so far as possible by reference to extensive bibliography and by the quality of his reasoning. It is certain that he is not afraid to have his readers check up his references. He cites his witnesses, by cross-examination secures their testimony, and gives his own conclusions. Industry and painstaking care have produced a volume that serves well as a cyclopedia in New Testament Christology. Students of the New Testament in Union University are to be congratulated on having a teacher who illustrates in himself severe self-discipline in research and the historical and psychological method of literary inquiry.

MILTON G. EVANS.

# BOOKS RECEIVED

**Revelation, the Crown-Jewel of Biblical Prophecy.** W. C. Stevens. Harrisburg, Pa.: The Christian Alliance Publishing Company. 1928. Two volumes. Price, $2.50 each.

The author is said to be a man of one book and is a capable and successful teacher of the Bible from the literalistic point of view. In the introduction Rev. F. W. Farr says, "From the view-point of literary excellence, exact scholarship, and high spirituality, it leaves little to be desired."

Rittenhouse Neisser.

**Southern Baptist Handbook.** 1927-1928. E. P. Alldredge, A. M., D. D. Nashville: Baptist Sunday School Board.

A handy volume of pocket size containing 557 pages of information concerning the work of Baptists in the South. Part I presents a survey of "Ten Years of Southern Baptist Work." Part II is devoted to an exhibit of work accomplished in 1927; directories of the Southern Baptist Convention and its various State Conventions; and a roster of ordained ministers. The work fully justifies the claim of the author that more information has been packed "in this Handbook than has ever been incorporated in any one volume dealing with the life and work of Southern Baptists."

Rittenhouse Neisser.

**God in Everything.** Frank M. Goodchild, D. D. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. Pp. 271. Price, $3.50 net.

The author, in his long ministry, was accustomed to preach an occasional nature sermon. In response to many requests for their publication, a few of the sermons were selected for this volume. In the preacher's own clear, earnest, gripping way, the Message of the Birds, Trees, Flowers, Sun, Stars, Sea, etc. is presented.

Doctor Goodchild did not live to see the book published, as it came from the press two months after his death. He could have no more fitting memorial than such a volume, written in the spirit of his own words: "God has given to us two Bibles—one of them is the book of nature; the other the book of grace. The book of nature is just as much God's word as the Bible."

Rittenhouse Neisser.

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